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DEATH OF THE REVOLUTION: THE LEGAL WAR ON
COMPETITIVE BROADBAND TECHNOLOGIES
John Blevins*
12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85 (2009)
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the role that law has played in
entrenching incumbents in the communications industry, with a
particular focus on broadband services. Earlier this decade,
several new "revolutionary" broadband technologies threatened
to fundamentally disrupt industry structures. This revolution,
however, never arrived. The reason, I argue, is that industry
consolidation transformed law into a powerful and versatile
entrenchment mechanism that stifled these emerging competitive
threats. Simply put, the sheer size superiorities enjoyed by today's
incumbent companies has created new and self-reinforcing
opportunities to use law to entrench their market position. My
focus, however, is not upon consolidation itself, but upon the
"entrenchment effects" that result from these dynamic
intersections of law and consolidation. My analysis implies that
many of the current regulatory reforms being considered by the
new Obama Administration may be futile. Consolidation has
created entities that are, in many respects, more powerful than the
law's ability to regulate them. The ultimate implication is that only
more aggressive reforms-such as comprehensive structural
remedies-can undo this deep entrenchment.
* Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. I would like to
thank Adam Gershowitz, Sharon Finegan, and Marvin Ammori for helpful
comments on both drafts and presentations of this paper. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
The early 2000s was an exciting time for new broadband
technologies. A new technological age seemed at hand-one that
promised to reshape the communications industry in fundamental
ways. In 2000, the future of the wireless market looked bright-it
was richly competitive and growing rapidly.' In 2004, the city of
Philadelphia made history by announcing an ambitious plan to
construct a public citywide WiFi service that would compete with
incumbent broadband providers like Verizon and Comcast.
Several other large cities followed suit.3 At the same time,
innovative companies like Vonage and SunRocket threatened the
century-old telephone network by offering new Internet-based
4voice services.
Today, at the decade's close, the landscape looks much
different. The revolution, it seems, never really arrived. The
wireless market is rapidly consolidating, and is increasingly
dominated by AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless, which are
themselves affiliates of the nation's two largest-and newly
consolidated-wireline companies. 5 Philadelphia's public WiFi
project collapsed in 2007, along with many other cities' municipal
6broadband projects. Vonage has staggered along for years on the
verge of bankruptcy, while SunRocket no longer exists.
7
In sum, the excitement and possibility of the early 2000s
has given way to consolidation, concentration, and the
entrenchment of incumbent providers. This Article examines why
these developments have happened-why did these new
technologies fail to materialize as expected? The failure, I argue,
resulted less from market realities than from policymakers' legal
and regulatory choices.
In this Article, I examine the role that law has played in
entrenching incumbents in the communications industry, with a
particular focus on broadband services. More specifically, I
examine how law has helped prevent various new technologies
from evolving into fully viable competitors to incumbent services.
To illustrate these dynamics, I focus on three technologies
that pose (or once posed) competitive threats to incumbent
1 See infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
2 Murray Dubin, Another First for City? Street Seeks Wireless Web Access for
Everyone, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 2, 2004, at B01.
3 Rob Pegoraro, Going to Town with WiFi, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at D1.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 160-165.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 26-28.
6 Richard Martin, EarthLink's Cutbacks Cast Cloud over Muni Wi-Fi Nets,
INFO. WEEK, Sept. 3, 2007, at 40; see also infra text accompanying notes 99-
102.
7 See infra p. 29.
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services: (1) wireless broadband; (2) municipal broadband, and (3)
Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP).8 While these technologies
obviously remain quite common, I argue that they could have
developed into far greater competitive threats to incumbents than
they currently are. Rather than disrupting modem communications
industry structures, law has instead channeled these technologies in
directions that reinforce and entrench the status quo.
The Article's first objective, then, is to delineate the role
law has played in entrenching these incumbents, and in preventing
new competitive technologies from reaching their potential. I next
offer a broader descriptive theory explaining why law has
developed into an entrenchment mechanism in these contexts. In
short, I argue that industry consolidation has transformed law into
a powerful and versatile entrenchment mechanism. The sheer size
superiorities enjoyed by today's major incumbent companies have
created new and self-reinforcing opportunities to use law to
entrench their market position.
My focus is not upon consolidation itself, but upon the
dynamic effects that result from the intersection of law and
consolidation. I refer to the results of these intersections as
"entrenchment effects," which can occur through (1)
concentrations of political power; (2) amplifications of barriers to
entry such as economies of scale and network effects; and (3)
"implicit doctrinal transformation"-the transformation of facially
neutral legal doctrine into a pro-incumbent entrenchment device.
My Article advances existing scholarship in several ways.
First, it focuses closely on how the dynamic intersections of size
and law have stifled competition, as opposed to focusing on either
size or law in isolation. Second, it applies this analytical
framework to new communications technologies-thus expanding
upon previous scholarship that has criticized communications
regulations from an agency capture or public choice perspective.
9
My analysis also has important and timely policy
implications for today's most pressing policy debates. To begin, it
8 As I explain infra p. 28, the Article focuses primarily upon independent
VoIP services, rather than upon facilities-based VoIP services.
9 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A
Structural Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 47 (2008) ("[T]he two most
noticeable themes in FCC history have been its catering to powerful interests
and, quite relatedly, its thwarting of the deployment of new technologies.");
Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car, & the Internet, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 873, 933-40 (2006) (examining how non-regulated entities
can "capture" agencies); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited
Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald
Coase 's "Big Joke ": An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. &
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undermines the notion that these debates are binary fights between
"regulatory" and "deregulatory" policies. In reality, incumbents
have used both regulation and deregulation to achieve their policy
objectives. Thus, today's debates are better understood in terms of
whether the policies at issue tend either to maintain or to
undermine incumbents' market positions.
Another important and novel implication is that many of
the current regulatory reforms proposed by the new Obama
Administration and its FCC may be futile. 10 Consolidation has
created entities that are, in many respects, more powerful than the
law's ability to regulate them. For instance, even if Congress
enacted a network neutrality requirement tomorrow, that law
would have no effect on Verizon's ability to weaken Vonage with
patent litigation, or to successfully lobby state governments to ban
municipal broadband. Those advantages are functions of size. The
ultimate implication is that more aggressive reforms-such as
comprehensive structural remedies-will be required to undo this
deep entrenchment.
Part I describes the role that law has played in stifling
competitive broadband technologies, and in entrenching incumbent
providers. Part II describes how law and size have intersected to
create various types of entrenchment effects in several contexts.
Part III considers the implications of this analysis to advocates of
both deregulatory and regulatory communications policies. Part IV
offers new policy recommendations, and urges today's
policymakers to "think bigger" as they develop new reforms that
protect and promote competition.
I. THE ROLE OF LAW IN ENTRENCHING INCUMBENTS
This Part provides specific examples of how law has helped
stifle new types of broadband access and Internet technologies.
Specifically, it examines three such technologies: (1) wireless
broadband; (2) municipal broadband; and (3) VoIP.
These three technologies were selected because they all
represent potential competitive threats to existing incumbent
services. Municipal broadband, for instance, competes with private
companies' broadband access services. Wireless broadband access
potentially competes with "landline" broadband access services
such as cable or DSL. VoIP is an Internet voice service that
competes with traditional telephone voice service.
10 See infra Section III.A.
11 Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong, Regulating Voice over Internet Protocol:
An E.U./U.S. Comparative Approach, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 549, 551-55
(2007) (providing an overview and definition of VoIP technology).
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In most instances, however, the technology has not been
prohibited. Indeed, technologies like VoIP and wireless broadband
are growing increasingly common.12 Instead, I show how legal and
regulatory choices have weakened these technologies and
incorporated them into existing industry structures. As a result, the
"revolutionary" technologies that once had the potential to
structurally disrupt the status quo are now reinforcing and
entrenching it.
A. Wireless Broadband
The story of wireless broadband differs from the "rise and
fall" of municipal broadband and independent VoIP (to be
described in the next sections). Unlike those services, wireless
broadband is growing and has never been more popular. The
success of Apple's iPhone, for instance, illustrates the increasing
popularity of, and demand for, wireless broadband services.
The story of wireless broadband, then, is one of unfilled
potential. The service could have developed into a faster, cheaper,
and more innovation-friendly service than what exists today. It
could have also developed into a more viable competitor to
wireline broadband. Its slow speeds and unreliability, however, are
no substitute for wireline broadband-either now, or in the
foreseeable future.13  Instead, wireless broadband's current
trajectory is to become a permanent inferior complement to
wireline broadband, rather than into a substitute.
12 For instance, the number of mobile broadband users (defined as a service
that is greater than 200 kbps in one direction) has gone from four hundred
thousand in 2005 to nearly sixty million today. INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIv.,
FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS:
STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2008 5 (2009),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/
DOC-292191A1.pdf. The number of estimated VoIP users is also growing, with
an estimated twenty million users today. Some analysts predict this number will
double by 2014. Telecom Notes, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 16, 2008.
13 Even the most cutting-edge smartphones, such as the iPhone, are plagued by
complaints about sluggish data speeds. Brad Reed, Six Common Complaints
about Apple's iPhone 3G; Dropped Calls, Slow Data and MobileMe Follies,
NETWORK WORLD, Sept. 5, 2008. More generally, recent statistics released from
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) show
that the average advertised speed for wireless broadband is around 3
MBit/second, which is one-quarter of advertised DSL speeds, one-fifth of
advertised cable speeds, and 1/22 of advertised fiber speeds. ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK 108-09 (2009). In
reality, these speeds are even lower when multiple users are present on the
networks. See Brian X. Chen, Verizon Leads, AT&T Runs Last in Wired.com's
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Looking ahead, wireless broadband is trending toward a
national duopoly consisting of AT&T Mobility and Verizon
Wireless, which creates numerous concerns for the future
competitiveness of wireless broadband markets.14 One concern is
that, once dominant, these carriers may "warehouse" spectrum-
particularly in non-urban areas-thereby limiting the ability of new
companies to enter the market. 15 An additional concern is that a
wireless duopoly will stifle various innovations in the wireless
application market. One recent controversy that illustrates these
concerns is AT&T and Apple's alleged blocking of Google Voice
on the iPhone. 16 Some analysts have argued AT&T had
anticompetitive motives, in that Google Voice is a potential
competitor to AT&T's wireless voice service.
17
In any event, the larger and clear trend in the wireless
industry has been toward steady consolidation, with fewer and
fewer competitors. As I explain, this development prevents
wireless broadband (at both the access and application levels) from
being what it could become in a more competitive market. This
consolidation, I argue, stems not from market forces, but from
historical legal policy choices.
1. The Evolution and Consolidation of Wireless
Broadband
Arguments that the wireless industry is increasingly
uncompetitive may surprise casual observers. Just a few years ago,
the industry enjoyed robust competition. In 2000, for instance,
virtually every metric indicated a competitive, growing market.
The number of subscribers skyrocketed in the 1990s. In 1990, there
were approximately 5.3 million wireless subscribers whose
average monthly bill was around eight dollars. In 2000, by
contrast, there were 109 million subscribers whose average
monthly bill had dropped to forty-five dollars.
18
14 See Comments of Free Press at 46-47, In re Inquiry Concerning the
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability, GN Docket 09-137
(Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Sept. 4, 2009) (providing estimates based on FCC
and carrier-provided information for overall broadband).
15 "Warehousing" here refers to owning spectrum licenses that are not used to
provide communications services. Smaller carriers routinely criticize larger
carriers for failing to use the large valuable blocks of spectrum that larger
carriers own in rural areas. See, e.g., Howard Buskirk, Need for New Spectrum
Cap Disputed in Filings at FCC, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 29, 2008.
16 Saul Hansel, Apple Tells F.C.C. It Is Still "Pondering" Google Voice
Application for the iPhone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at B3.
17 Andy Kessler, WhyAT&TKilledGoogle Voice, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2009.
18 Sixth Report, In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 app. C, tbl. 1, 16 FCC Rcd. 13,350 (2001).
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Critically, customers also had a wide range of choices in a
market that was no longer concentrated. In 1997, for instance,
there were six legitimate "national" carriers. 19 The largest two
carriers commanded roughly 21% of the market, while the top four
commanded less than half (49%).20
The story is much different today. Since 2000, the industry
has rapidly consolidated in a wave of mergers of all sizes.
Indeed, the industry has experienced over a dozen major mergers
since 2004 alone. These mergers include: NextWave/Cingular
(2004); Cingular/AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (AT&T) (2004);
Alltel/Western Wireless Corp. (2005); Nextel/Sprint (2005);
AT&T/BellSouth Corp. (2007); AT&T/Dobson (2007); T-
Mobile/SunCom Wireless (2008); AT&T/Aloha Partners (2008);
Verizon Wireless/Rural Cellular (2008); Verizon/Alltel (2008);
AT&T/Centennial (2009) (announced).22
The most recent mergers indicate that consolidation is not
showing any signs of slowing. Verizon's 2009 acquisition of Alltel
combined the second- and fifth-largest carriers in the country.
23
AT&T-which has acquired several companies in the past two
years-recently announced plans to acquire Centennial, which has
over a million subscribers and is the nation's eleventh largest
carrier.
24
These mergers have created a much different world than
existed at the beginning of the decade. Following the Alltel
merger, the top four carriers now command roughly 87% of
19 Competition in the Commercial Mobile Broadband Radio Services Second
Annual Report, In the Matter of Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 tbls. 1-2, 12 FCC Rcd. 11,266
(1997); see also Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, LLC, In re Service
Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands at 9-10, WT Docket
No. 06-150 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n May 23, 2007). As a disclaimer, I was a
(very) junior attorney for a firm that represented Frontline at the time.
20 Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, supra note 19.
21 Adam Bender, Small, Big Carriers at Odds on Spectrum Cap Revival,
COMM. DAILY, Dec. 4, 2008 ("Since the FCC lifted the last spectrum cap in
2001, more than a dozen wireless mergers or acquisitions have occurred .... ");
Howard Buskirk, Public Interest Groups Say Wireless Market Is Getting Less
Competitive, COMM. DAILY, June 18, 2009 (outlining public interests groups'
critiques).
22 For a comprehensive list of these mergers and their approvals by the FCC,
see Rural Telecomms. Group, Inc. Petition for Rulemaking To Impose a
Spectrum Aggregation Limit at 8-10, In the Matter of Rural
Telecommunications Group, Inc., RM- 11498 (Fed. Commcn's Comm'n July 16,
2008).
23 Thirteenth Report, In re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 app. A, tbl. A-4, 24 FCC Rcd. 6185 (2009);
Memorandum Opinion and Order and Declaratory Ruling, In re Cellco P'ship,
23 FCC Rcd. 17,444 (2008) (approving the Verizon Wireless/Alltel merger).
24 Thirteenth Report, supra note 23, at app. A, tbl. A-4.
2009-2010
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subscribers (compared to less than half a decade earlier).25 The
largest two carriers-AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless-now
command around 60% of the market, and are growing rapidly.
26
These two carriers are also gaining a higher percentage of new
subscribers,27 while companies like Sprint (the third-largest carrier)
have recently experienced significant customer loss.
28
The wireless industry's growing concentration is also
evident in the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), an index
commonly used by policymakers to measure market concentration.
The most recent FCC Competition Report found that the wireless
industry had an index of 2674.29 To put that score in perspective,
the Department of Justice considers any industry that scores above
1800 to be "highly concentrated. 3 ° While the HHI has its critics, it
does at least indicate trends. And the concentration levels have
grown progressively higher in recent years-from 2151 in 2004 to
2674 today.
The combined effect of these mergers has triggered
scrutiny from government officials who fear the industry is
excessively concentrated and is engaging in various
anticompetitive practices. In June 2009, for instance, Senator Herb
Kohl, Chairman of the Senate's antitrust subcommittee, expressed
concern about the "concentrated nature of the cell phone
marketplace," and demanded a federal investigation of alleged
anticompetitive practices including exclusivity agreements with
handset manufacturers. 3 1 According to news reports, the
Department of Justice's Antitrust Division is scrutinizing the
industry as well.32 These fears of excessive concentration have also
25 Id. (calculating Alltels' subscribers as Verizon's).
26 See Jeffrey Silva, Wireless Policies Scrutinized Under Obama Advisers,
RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Dec. 1, 2008 ("The market clout of Verizon Wireless and
AT&T Mobility-which towers over weaker rivals Sprint Nextel Corp. and T-
Mobile USA-also has prompted other competitive concerns .... ")
27 Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, LLC, supra note 19, at 9-10.
28 Thirteenth Report, supra note 23, at app. A, tbl. A-4 (listing Sprint's total
subscribers in 2006 versus 2007).
29 Id. at 6212-13.
30 Susan Polyakova, Consumer Groups Oppose Sprint-Nextel Merger, COMM.
DAILY, Apr. 1, 2005.
31 Cecilia Kang, Key Senator Backs Telecom Probe, Concerns Grow in
Congress over Cellphone Carriers'Practices, WASH. POST, Jul. 7, 2009.
32 Amol Sharma, Telecoms Face Antitrust Threat, Wireless Market, Generic
Drugs Reviewed as Justice Department Steps Up Enforcement, WALL ST. J.,
July 7, 2009 ("AT&T and Verizon have become the two dominant players and
have a great deal of clout with equipment makers. Combined, they have ninety
million land-line customers and 60% of the 274 million U.S. wireless
subscribers.").
9
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led the FCC to pursue more aggressive regulatory reforms on
several fronts recently.33
The ultimate fear underlying these interventions is that the
wireless industry's consolidation will stifle competition, which will
lead to slower deployment, inferior speeds, higher prices, less
openness, and less choice. These fears are compounded by the fact
that the emerging duopoly consists of two carriers who are
affiliated with the largest two Bell Operating Companies (AT&T
and Verizon) who both have extensive wireline infrastructures that
all wireless carriers depend upon.
34
Indeed, consumers are already experiencing some of these
effects. In recent years, for instance, prices have stabilized, and are
no longer dropping.35 Various public interest organizations have
also documented various practices that allegedly illustrate a lack of
competition, including parallel pricing regimes, limitations on
terms of service, early termination fees, and other high switching
costs.
36
2. The Role ofLaw
In this Section, I argue that the wireless industry
consolidation's was driven largely by regulatory policy choices. I
group these regulatory choices into three broader categories: (1)
spectrum allocations; (2) special-access deregulation; and (3)
roaming regulations. Collectively, these categories of policies
transformed the wireless industry into its present consolidated
state.
i. Spectrum Allocations
The two most important facts about spectrum are that it is
an essential input for wireless broadband, and that not all ranges of
spectrum are created equal. In other words, carriers not only need
spectrum, they need good spectrum. Generally speaking, lower
33 These various interventions are outlined in detail infra Section III.A.
34 Jeffrey Silva, Wireless Policies Scrutinized Under Obama Advisers, RCR
WIRELESS NEWS, Dec. 1, 2008 ("Verizon Communications Inc. and AT&T Inc.
dominate a special access market that the General Accountability Office-
Congress' watchdog arm - said is not competitive in major U.S. cities.").
35 Gene Kimmelman, Mark Cooper & Magda Herrera, Failure of Competition
Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 511, 515 (2006)
("[I]n the past several years, as market shares have stabilized, so too has
pricing.").
36 See, e.g., Comments of Consumer Fed'n of Am., Consumers Union, Free
Press, Media Access Project, New Am. Found., & Public Knowledge at 7-19, In
re Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, WT Docket No. 09-66 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n June 15, 2009)
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frequency spectrum is better suited for wireless broadband service
than higher frequency spectrum. At lower frequencies, radio waves
travel further and have better ability to penetrate obstacles such as
buildings and hills.
37
The fact that spectrum quality varies explains the
importance of the most recent spectrum auction in 2008 (700 MHz
Auction). That auction not merely offered more spectrum, it
offered extremely valuable low-frequency spectrum-so-called
"beachfront" spectrum. 38 Most of this spectrum had originally been
allocated to television broadcasters decades ago.39 The 700 MHz
Auction reallocated a portion of this beachfront spectrum to other
uses, though many scholars think the allocation remains woefully
insufficient.
40
To provide historical perspective, the structure of the
wireless industry has always turned sharply on congressional and
regulatory decisions about spectrum allocations. Policymakers
have made the industry both more and less competitive over the
years through their decisions.
It is well known, for instance, that the FCC singlehandedly
stifled the cellular industry for decades.4 1 Although the technology
had arrived by the 1960s, the FCC dragged their feet for years and
did not actually authorize cellular service until 1981 (1981
Order).42 Even then, however, the FCC made a critical decision to
authorize only two wireless carriers in each designated geographic
area, with each carrier being awarded a 20 MHz block of
37 Martin Defends FCC's 700 MHz Auction Rules as Pro-Consumer, WASH.
INTERNET DAILY, Aug. 3, 2007 ("Referring to the 700-MHz band as 'beachfront
property,' Martin called the spectrum 'particularly valuable' because the radio
signals 'can penetrate walls very easily and can carry lots of information at very
low power."'); Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, LLC, supra note 19, at
7.
38 See, e.g., Joan Engebretson, Public Safety Eyes 700 MHz Spectrum,
TELEPHONY, Apr. 9, 2007 ("Often likened to 'beachfront property,' the 700
MHz band not only can support 4G mobile broadband services, it also has
excellent propagation characteristics and could enable broad geographic
coverage .... ).
39 Susan P. Crawford, The Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
933, 961-63 (2008).
40 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Roasting the Pig To Burn Down the
House: A Modest Proposal, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 95, 96 (2009);
Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Market Regulation and Innovation:
Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 663, 668-70 (2005).
41 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 9, at 49-51; Hazlett, supra note 9, at 407-52.
42 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 9, at 50; see also Report and Order, In re an
Inquiry into the Use of Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellular
Commc'ns Sys., 86 F.C.C.2d 469, 470 (1981) [hereinafter 1981 Order]
(authorizing reallocation of spectrum).
11
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43spectrum. In essence, the FCC set up a duopoly from the very
beginning, although this duopoly was eventually abandoned in the
early 1990s (as I explain below).
The FCC's 1981 Order, however, made one decision that
has had a more lasting impact that we continue to feel today.
Specifically, it gave away one of these two blocks of spectrum to
the local incumbent telephone carrier for free. 44 Following the
breakup of AT&T, this decision meant that wireless affiliates of
the Regional Bell Operating Companies generally obtained the
licenses for this spectrum. This gift provided an enormous
competitive advantage in several respects, particularly in later
years as demand rose sharply. First, it allowed these companies to
obtain an essential input for free. Second, it provided them with
critical low-frequency spectrum, which is comparatively better than
the higher-frequency spectrum the FCC reallocated in later years.
4 5
The consequences of this decision remain evident nearly
thirty years later. Today, this low-frequency spectrum is controlled
mostly by AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless, who have
acquired, or merged with, the incumbent carriers who originally
inherited this spectrum. 46 The spectrum that companies like Sprint,
by contrast, control is higher-frequency, and thus comparatively
inferior. Higher-frequency waves do not travel as far, and are less
resilient. Accordingly, carriers using higher-frequency spectrum
must build more towers and infrastructure to provide equal ranges
of service.47 In short, the higher the frequency, the higher the
business costs.
In 1981, FCC Commissioner Mark Fowler wrote what has
proved to be a prescient dissent predicting this development. He
warned:
I regretfully dissent from the majority's decision
to continue the automatic "set aside" for wireline
carriers of half the spectrum available for
43 Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, In re an Inquiry into
the Use of Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellular Commc'ns Sys.,
89 F.C.C.2d 58, 69-70 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Order] (describing the 1981
Order and affirming with slight modifications).
44 1981 Order, supra note 43, at 477-78; see also Jim Chen, The Echoes of
Forgotten Footfalls: Telecommunications Mergers at the Dawn of the Digital
Millennium, 43 HOUS. L. REv. 1311, 1366-67 (2007).
41 Chen, supra note 44, at 1367 (providing general summary of regulatory
history reallocating the higher-frequency spectrum).
46 Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, LLC, supra note 19, at 7-8 ("It is no
accident that the two largest wireless carriers today were handed (for free) the
low-frequency 800 MHz spectrum in the early days of cellular. These
incumbents enjoy significant competitive advantages which stem from decades-
old grants of low-frequency spectrum." (footnote omitted)).
47 Id. at 7.
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establishment of cellular radio services.... in light
of the anticompetitive difficulties it creates.
Non-wireline carriers ... will be irreparably
injured because ... the wireline carriers will have a
"headstart" that will enable them to capture most of
the interested cellular customers before a non-
wireline carrier can be certified ....
.... We have been warned by the Department
of Justice (DOJ) that "this licensing scheme assures
the dominance of AT&T in what might otherwise
be a highly competitive industry."
.... [T]he successful applicants will in all
likelihood remain the providers of cellular service
for decades into the future.
48
The next dramatic shift in the wireless industry structure
came in 1993, when Congress decided to open up substantial
amounts of new spectrum, and to allocate it via auctions.
49
Critically, the FCC also adopted a spectrum cap, which limited the
amount of spectrum (at 45 MHz) that any one carrier could possess
in a designated geographic area.50 The FCC explained that the
spectrum caps would "promote diversity and competition in mobile
services" because carriers "might [otherwise] exert undue market
power or inhibit market entry by other service providers if
permitted to aggregate large amounts of spectrum." 51 The diverse
competitive landscape of the late 1990s and early 2000s stems
directly from these policy decisions, and from the spectrum cap in
particular.
Following the change of presidential administrations, the
FCC revisited the spectrum caps in 2001. It ultimately decided to
eliminate the spectrum caps, effective in 2003.52 The FCC
48 1982 Order, supra note 43, at 105-06 (Fowler, Comm'r, dissenting in part).
49 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002,
107 Stat. 312, 387-88 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (2006)).
50 For a general historical overview of these initial allocations, see Ari Q.
Fitzgerald & R. Clark Wadlow, The Year in Wireless: October 2001-September
2002, 731 PRACTICING L. INST. 87 (2002). The 45 MHz figure was for
metropolitan service areas. For rural service areas, the cap was soon raised to 55
MHz. Id. at 94-95.
51 Third Report and Order, In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of
the Communications Act, 9 FCC Rcd. 7988, 8100 (1994).
52 Report and Order, 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review Spectrum Aggregation
Limits for Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 16 FCC Rcd. 22,668, 22,669
(2001) [hereinafter 2001 Spectrum Cap Order].
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reasoned the caps were no longer necessary "in light of the strong
growth of competition in [wireless] markets."
53
As predicted at the time, the lifting of the spectrum caps
triggered a rapid wave of consolidation within the industry from
2003 to the present, as documented above. 54 Regardless of one's
view of the policy merits of spectrum caps, their elimination
opened the door to today's consolidation.
More recently, spectrum auctions that originally held out
the promise of new competitive entry have instead resulted in
further consolidation. AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless, for
instance, were the "big winners" in the 700 MHz auction.
55
Together, the two companies accounted for over 80% of the
revenues raised, and Verizon Wireless also purchased virtually all
of the ten largest regional "C-Block" licenses, which can be
aggregated to create a national network.56 Further, some of the next
largest winners, such as Echostar, won spectrum licenses that are
not well suited to create new national broadband competitors.
57
Indeed, these overall results make it virtually impossible for a new
national wireless competitor to emerge, given the limited amount
of spectrum currently available.
Although any company with greater resources has an
advantage at an auction, critics claimed that the regulatory service
rules and procedures governing the auctions helped prevent new
competitive entry. They argued, for instance, that the FCC should
have prevented large companies from bidding on certain blocks of
spectrum, or should have provided more incentives for smaller
carriers (known as "designated entities") to obtain spectrum.
58
13 Id. at 22,670-71. As critics noted, however, the caps helped fuel the
competition that was ultimately cited to eliminate the caps. Id. at 22,738 (Copps,
Comm'r, dissenting) ("The wireless industry has been tremendously successful.
I believe that this is due, in part, to the spectrum cap.").
54 In dissent, Commissioner Copps accurately predicted this consolidation. See
id. at 22,737 ("It is interesting to note that in anticipation of the cap being lifted
financial and industry experts are reporting on a large set of potential mergers,
predicting significant consolidation and labeling smaller competitors as 'munch
bait' if the cap is eliminated. This should give us pause.").
55 Nick Wood, Incumbents Victorious in FCC Auction, TOTAL TELECOM, Mar.
25, 2008 ("Verizon Wireless and AT&T, the two dominant U.S. mobile players,
last week emerged as the big winners from the Federal Communications
Commission's recently ended spectrum auction.").
56 Jeffrey Silva, 700 MHz Auction Ends, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Mar. 24, 2008.
The remaining regional C-Block licenses covered more geographically distant
areas like Alaska and the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
57 Id. (discussing Echostar's spectrum winnings).
58 A company named Council Tree actually sued, seeking to invalidate the
auction on these grounds. See Wireless, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 20, 2009 ("Council
Tree argued that the designated entity rules approved for the 700 MHz auction
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Although spectrum allocations are arguably the most
important regulatory force driving consolidation, the next sections
examine two more policy choices that have also contributed to
these trends.
ii. Special Access
Wireless broadband only works if mobile users and their
devices can actually connect to the broader communications
network. When a mobile user places a phone call or attempts to
access a web page, the information must first travel from the
mobile device to a receiver of some kind. These receivers are often
located on towers or on the roofs of buildings. From there,
however, the information must somehow travel from the receiver
to the larger telephone and Internet networks. "Special access"
facilities make this transfer of information possible.
Broadly speaking, special access refers to voice and data
lines (i.e., the physical infrastructures) that are dedicated to an
individual user and that connect the user to the larger network.59
To use a rough analogy, special access lines are similar to
individual off-ramps that would connect you-and only you-to
an interstate highway from a local road. The types of customers
who need these dedicated lines tend to be large businesses,
hospitals, universities, and wireless cell towers. Any structure with
a wireless receiver (tower, building, etc.) must generally have its
own dedicated access line to transfer data from mobile phones to
the global network.
Special access lines are therefore a critical input for
wireless service. 60 The potential problem, however, is that special
access infrastructure is overwhelmingly owned by the Regional
Bell Operating Companies-Verizon, AT&T, and (the much
smaller) Qwest.6 1 This poses a particularly difficult problem for
national carriers such as Sprint and T-Mobile, for instance, who
lack wireline affiliates that own special access infrastructure.
62
Accordingly, these two carriers must obtain the overwhelming
majority of their special access services from incumbent wireline
59 For a general overview of these services and their history, see generally U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: FCC NEEDS To IMPROVE
ITS ABILITY TO MONITOR AND DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF COMPETITION IN
DEDICATED ACCESS SERVICES (2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
60 Comments of Sprint Nextel Corp. app. at 2, In re Special Access Rates for
Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, WC Docket No. 05-25 (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Aug. 8., 2007) ("Special access facilities are a significant input in the
provision of both Commercial Mobile Radio Services . . . and wireless
broadband services.").
61 See GAO REPORT, supra note 59.
62 Buskirk, supra note 21.
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carriers like AT&T and Verizon (whose wireless affiliates compete
with Sprint and T-Mobile).63
The lack of competition in the special access market has
roots in the monopoly era, when the national telephone network
was constructed with public subsidies and protections from
competition. Given the enormous barriers to entry, it is unrealistic
to expect that any private company could replicate the ubiquity of
the national phone network today. 64 While the special access
market can potentially be more competitive in densely populated
urban and commercial areas, the potential revenues are too small
throughout most of the country to engage in such massive
construction projects.
Because it was largely a monopoly, special access services
were historically regulated. In 1999, however, the FCC decided
that the market was sufficiently competitive-or at least
sufficiently capable of new entry-that it deregulated wide
segments of special access services (effective in 2001). While I
have provided a detailed description of this process in a previous
article, 65 the general concern is that the FCC's deregulation has led
to increasing prices. Indeed, a recent report from the General
Accounting Office (GAO) has documented these price increases,
concluding that prices are rising in areas that have been the most
thoroughly deregulated (and thus theoretically most subject to
competition).66
These sharp price increases pose significant problems to
competitive wireless carriers. Because special access (like
spectrum) is a critical input, paying more for this service increases
the costs of providing service. The rising prices thus pose barriers
both to new entrants, and to existing companies who wish to
expand.67
The larger point is that special access deregulation has
fueled consolidation by making the input relatively more expensive
63 Comments of Sprint Nextel Corp., supra note 60, at iii (stating that Sprint
purchases between 97% and 99% of its DS1 and DS3 circuits in Chicago,
Boston, and San Francisco from incumbents); Reply Comments of T-Mobile
USA, Inc. at 4, In re Special Access Rates for Price Cap Local Exchange
Carriers, WC Docket No. 05-25 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Aug. 15, 2007)
(stating that T-Mobile purchases 92% of its DS1 channel terminations-and
90% of its interoffice transport-from incumbents).
64 GAO REPORT, supra note 59, at 1 ("The incumbent firms have an essentially
ubiquitous local network that generally reaches all of the business locations in
their local areas.").
65 John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation: The Role of "Intermodal" and
"Facilities-Based" Competition in Communications Policy, 60 ALA. L. REV.
241, 271-74 (describing proceedings that deregulated special access).
66 GAO REPORT, supra note 59, at 13-14, 28-29.
67 Buskirk, supra note 21 (noting criticisms that "[s]pecial access prices present
a barrier to growth").
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for wireless carriers who lack special access infrastructure. Indeed,
it is no accident that the two largest wireless carriers today are
affiliated with the two companies that possess the nation's most
extensive special access infrastructure. The money that AT&T




The FCC's regulatory choices on roaming have also
contributed to consolidation. Generally speaking, roaming refers to
a mobile customer's use of a wireless network with which she has
no preexisting relationship.69 When you roam, you are using some
other company's network facilities. Wireless companies therefore
enter into roaming agreements with one another that dictate the
terms and conditions of calls that one carrier's subscribers place on
another carrier's network facilities. The smaller and more limited a
company's network facilities are, the more critical that roaming
agreements become.
The FCC distinguishes between "manual" and "automatic"
roaming.70 Manual roaming, which is less common today, refers to
situations where a mobile user's wireless company has no existing
arrangement with the company whose network the user is trying to
access. In these circumstances, the user generally must provide a
credit card number before the wireless provider will complete the
call. yl
Automatic roaming, by contrast, occurs when a user's
wireless company does have a preexisting arrangement with the
company the user is trying to access.7 2 This type of roaming is far
more common, and it allows calls to be made more quickly and
easily.
Traditionally, the FCC has considered manual roaming to
be a regulated common carrier service under Title II of the
Communications Act of 1934.73 Because of this classification,
68 Public Interest CMRS Comments, supra note 36, at 25.
69 Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers, 22 FCC Rcd. 15,817, 15,819 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 Roaming
Order].
70 Id. at 15,819-20.
71 Indeed, automatic roaming has been more common for some time. See
Cingular Opposes Automatic Roaming Requirement, CT WIRELESS, Nov. 16,
2000 (noting a source as saying that automatic roaming is "extremely common"
today).
72 2007 Roaming Order, supra note 69, at 15,819-20.
73 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (2006); 2007 Roaming Order, supra note 69, at
15,820-22 (providing a general history of the FCC's regulatory treatment of
roaming).
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carriers must complete manual roaming calls in a
nondiscriminatory manner, and cannot charge "unreasonable"
rates.
The FCC has traditionally declined, however, to impose a
similar requirement on automatic roaming. 74 The agency's failure
to do so has generated intense criticism for years from smaller and
mid-sized carriers who claimed that larger carriers' roaming
practices were hurting competition. These carriers argued, for
instance, that roaming rates have spiked in recent years as the
industry has consolidated.75
Another complaint that smaller carriers raise is that
consolidation has reduced the number of potential roaming
partners available to them.76 This problem is compounded by the
fact that wireless carriers have traditionally used different-and
incompatible-digital protocols, or standards. Some carriers use a
standard known as CMDA, while others use a standard called
GSM. Roaming arrangements, however, are only feasible with
carriers who share the same digital format.77 For these reasons,
small and mid-sized carriers have found it increasingly difficult to
"shop around" for reasonable roaming agreements as the number
of roaming options has steadily dwindled and prices steadily
increased.
In 2007, the FCC responded to these concerns by
classifying automatic roaming as a regulated common carrier
service. Critically, however, the FCC imposed two important
exceptions that significantly limited the scope of its new
regulation. First, it concluded that the automatic roaming rule does
not apply to data, but only to voice calls. 79 Thus, smaller carriers
74 The FCC opened a proceeding in 2000 on whether to adopt such a rule, but
never acted upon it. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Automatic and Manual
Roaming Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, 15 FCC
Rcd. 21,628, 21,629 (2000).
75 See, e.g., Comments of Cricket Commc'ns, Inc. at 7-9, In re Annual Report
and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to Commercial
Mobile Services, WT Docket No. 09-66 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n June 15,
2009) (criticizing roaming rates).
76 Buskirk, supra 62 (noting the concern that "disappearance of several former
roaming partners as a result of the recent market consolidation has made it much
more difficult for small, rural and regional carriers to negotiate reciprocal
roaming agreements").
77 For a discussion of this compatibility problem, see Comments of MetroPCS
Commc'ns, Inc. at 6, In re Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market
Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, WT Docket No. 09-66
(Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n June 15, 2009) [hereinafter MetroPCS Comments].
78 2007 Roaming Order, supra note 69, at 15,818.
79 Id. at 15,819 ("We note that roaming, as a common carrier obligation, does
not extend to services that are classified as information services or to services
that are not CMRS.").
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are now entitled to reasonable roaming agreements for voice calls,
but not for wireless broadband services. This exception will
become increasingly significant as wireless broadband usage
increases in the future.
The second exception is the "in-market" exception. Under
this rule, automatic roaming protections do not apply in areas
where carriers already own spectrum. 80 Thus, if a smaller carrier
has rights to spectrum but has not yet constructed its own network,
it cannot obtain roaming rights within this area. The FCC's
rationale was that a roaming rule in this context would discourage
smaller carriers from constructing their own facilities. 81 Critics,
however, argued that rule prevents carriers from gradually building
a customer base that would allow them to construct facilities over
82time.
In any event, the inability to secure favorable roaming
agreements has limited, and will continue to limit, the competitive
strength of smaller and mid-sized carriers. The growth of mid-
sized carriers, in particular, is important given that they have the
most potential to eventually grow into national competitors. 83 As
described above, however, these mid-sized carriers have been
disappearing lately, and carriers' inability to get more favorable
roaming agreements has played an important role in their
disappearance.
B. Municipal Broadband
"Municipal broadband" refers broadly to efforts by
municipal governments to provide broadband service to their
residents. 84 The term encompasses a diverse range of network
types, and includes both wireless and wireline networks.85 The
term also encompasses various types of ownership models,
80 Id. at 15,834-36 ("We determine that our automatic roaming obligation does
not include an in-market or home roaming requirement.").
81 Id. at 15,835 (discussing "incentive[s] to build-out").
82 Jeffrey Silva, In-Market Roaming Debate Hangs over Carrier Mergers,
RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008 (quoting smaller carriers' argument that in-
market roaming "would promote spectrum acquisition and system expansion by
assisting carriers in acquiring a customer base").
83 Bender, supra note 21.
84 FED. TRADE COMM'N, MUNICIPAL PROVISION OF WIRELESS INTERNET 6
(2006) [hereinafter 2006 FTC REPORT].
85 As detailed below, examples of municipal wireline networks include the
high-speed fiber networks constructed in cities like Lafayette, Louisiana and
Bristol, Virginia. The more common choice, however, is to use wireless
networks. The high-profile examples of municipal broadband projects in
Philadelphia and San Francisco involved citywide wireless coverage. See infra
p. 18.
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including everything from complete government control to public-
private partnerships.
1. The Rise and Fall of Municipal Broadband
Just a few years ago, municipal broadband promised to be
the next big thing in broadband access. In the first half of this
decade, municipal projects seemed to be popping up everywhere.
During this short time, literally hundreds of cities announced plans
for various types of municipal broadband projects-most of them
wireless networks. 86 Commentators noted the "spiraling" growth of
municipal networks nationally. 87 The high point seemed to come in
the idealistic days of 2004, which Andrea Tapia calls "the year of
municipal planning."
88
In addition to increasing in number, municipal projects also
grew more ambitious. Several large cities announced plans to
create expansive citywide wireless networks. The most famous-
and infamous-project was Philadelphia's joint venture with
Earthlink, 89 a private Internet service provider. 90 This ambitious
project, announced with great fanfare, promised to bring
affordable, high-speed broadband to the entire city. Speaking with
grand rhetoric, Philadelphia Mayor John Street declared that "just
like roads and transportation were keys to our past, a digital
infrastructure and wireless technology are keys to our future."
91
Philadelphia, however, was not alone in these ambitions. Other
86 BALHOFF & ROWE, LLC, MUNICIPAL BROADBAND: DIGGING BENEATH THE
SURFACE 18, 28-29 (2005) (noting that wireless growth has been greatest); Craig
Dingwall, Municipal Broadband: Challenges and Perspectives, 59 FED. COMM.
L.J. 67, 81-85 (2006).
87 Dingwall, supra note 86, at 81 ("[M]unicipal-provided telecommunications
services have spiraled over the past few years . . . ."); see also John Cox,
Municipal Wi-Fi 2.0, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 21, 2008, at 22 ("In the 2004-
2006 time period, scores of municipalities of every size were writing up requests
for proposals for something that had never been deployed before: large-scale,
Wi-Fi mesh networks.").
88 Andrea H. Tapia, Municipal Broadband, in ...AND COMMUNICATIONS FOR
ALL: A POLICY AGENDA FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION 223, 224-25 (Amit M.
Schejter ed., 2008); Andrea Tapia & Julio Ortiz, Municipal Responses to State-
Level Broadband Internet Policy 2 (2006).
89 Earthlink is an Internet service provider that contracted with multiple cities
to provide public WiFi service.
90 Several overviews on the Philadelphia project have been written. See, e.g.,
JOSHUA BREITBART, THE PHILADELPHIA STORY: LEARNING FROM A MUNICIPAL
WIRELESS PIONEER (2007); Adam Christensen, 'Wi-Fi'ght Them When You Can
Join Them? How the Philadelphia Compromise May Have Saved Municipally-
Owned Telecommunications Services, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 683 (2006).
91 Christensen, supra note 90, at 695.
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cities-including Houston and San Francisco-soon followed with
equally bold proposals to offer citywide service.
92
Although wireless networks were the most common form
of municipal broadband, some local governments opted to
construct "wireline" networks consisting of high-speed fiber
lines. 93 Fiber networks offer several advantages over wireless
networks, including far greater speeds, better reliability and
increased scalability. 94 Fiber networks, however, are also far more
expensive to build because they require extensive digging and
wiring. 95 Some of best-known examples of municipal fiber projects
are Lafayette, Louisiana; Bristol, Virginia; and the "UTOPIA"
consortium of cities in Utah.
96
Across the country, local government officials hailed these
new network projects as innovative, and promised that they would
help bridge the "digital divide." 97 Other officials argued that
municipal projects were necessary because residents' choices were
limited, and incumbents had delayed network upgrades for years.
98
In short, the future looked bright.
Municipal broadband's good times, however, were not to
last. The excitement and promise of municipal broadband earlier in
the decade gave way to a series of expensive and spectacular
failures. Virtually every one of the most ambitious citywide
projects has either collapsed or been scaled back drastically.
The woes of the various Earthlink municipal projects
illustrate this broader decline. Earthlink was at the heart of the
revolution that municipal broadband had promised earlier this
decade. The company had contracted and negotiated with various
large cities including Philadelphia, Houston, Chicago, Anaheim,
Corpus Christi, and San Francisco to provide ambitious citywide
92 Rob Pegoraro, Going to Town with WiFi, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at D1.
93 BALHOFF & ROWE, LLC, supra note 86, at 10, 27-28.
94 WiMax Offers Less Bang Than Fiber, Panelists Say, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 31,
2009; 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 84, at 2, 6, 34; BALHOFF & ROWE, LLC,
supra note 86, at 92-93, 99.
95 WiMax, supra note 94.
96 BALHOFF & ROWE, LLC, supra note 86, at 35-50.
97 Alexis Grant, City's WiFi Plan: Access for All, Lower-Income Residents
Could Be Among Top Beneficiaries of Mayor's Proposal, HOuS. CHRON., Feb.
25, 2007, at B4.
98 See How Internet Protocol-Enabled Services Are Changing the Face of
Communications: A View from Government Officials: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy
& Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Lewis K. Billings, Mayor,
Provo, Utah) ("In many cases, the private sector has responded that it did not
have immediate plans to provide broadband service or upgrade existing services
to meet the bandwidth needs of businesses and residents. Smaller communities
have two choices-wait until an incumbent provider decides to provide service,
if it does so at all, or build the network themselves.").
105
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WiFi networks, which would have been the largest projects in the
country. 99 In 2007, however, citing financial problems, Earthlink
began formally withdrawing from these projects. In the same year,
it ended projects in Houston, San Francisco, and Chicago,
announcing it was seeking "strategic alternatives" to municipal
broadband. 100 It formally terminated its Philadelphia network in
2008.10 1 Following the collapse of these high-profile projects, a
"pall of disappointment" descended on municipal broadband. 102
Of course, hundreds of municipal broadband networks still
exist across the country. 10 3 These networks, however, tend to be
smaller in scope and far less ambitious than the networks proposed
earlier this decade. Cities such as Miami that once had ambitious
citywide plans ultimately settled for scattered public hotspots.
10 4
Chicago has done the same, abandoning its proposed citywide
networks for isolated wireless zones under its Digital Excellence
Initiative.1
0 5
99 Richard Martin, Earthlink's Cutbacks Cast Cloud over Muni Wi-Fi Nets,
INFO. WEEK, Sept. 3, 2007, at 40; Dan Meyer, Low-Fi, RCR WIRELESS NEWS,
Sept. 3, 2007, at 10 ("These appear to be dark days for municipal Wi-Fi. The
once-promising way to bring wireless broadband to the masses has hit that hard
wall separating hype from reality."). Earthlink was in serious negotiations with
Chicago, but had not formalized in agreement. Id.
100 Earthlink Said Rethinking Muni Wireless Strategy, TELECOM A.M., Nov. 20,
2007 ("EarthLink is considering 'strategic alternatives' for its struggling
municipal wireless business."); Editorial, Goodbye Wi-Fi? Earthlink Prefers to
Pay Penalty to Houston Rather than Perform on Citywide Wireless Contract,
HouS. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2007, at B8; Judy Keen, Cities Turning Off Plans for
Wi-Fi, USA TODAY, Sept. 20, 2007, at 1A.
101 Deborah Yao, Earthlink To Pull the Plug on Wi-Fi in Philadelphia, ASSOC.
PRESS, May 13, 2008.
102 Stimulus Stimulates Old Fight over Municipal Networks, COMM. DAILY,
May 5, 2009 ("Many of those undertakings, such as in San Francisco and
Philadelphia, fizzled. Revenue proved elusive. Carriers like EarthLink woke up,
smelled the balance sheet and, as fast as they'd signed on, pulled out. A pall of
disappointment descended on muni broadband.").
103 Estimates vary and depend on how one defines municipal broadband, but the
most current and comprehensive list of municipal wireless networks is Esme
Vos, Muniwireless Updates List of Cities and Counties with Large Wi-Fi
Networks, Mar. 28, 2009, http://www.muniwireless.com/2009/03/28/muniwire
less-list-of-cities-with-wifi. Tapia writes that over four hundred municipalities
have entered the arena. Tapia, supra note 88, at 223.
104 New Business Models Said Key to Successful Municipal Wi-Fi, COMM.
DAILY, June 30, 2008 ("In Miami Dade County, the original full coverage
network of over 2,000 miles was shrunk to a few hot spots .... ").
105 John Pletz, City Launches New Push for Broadband; Seeks $100 Million
from Feds for Wireless Network, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., June 22, 2009; Public
Spaces: Loop Wireless Hotspot Map, http://egov.cityofchicago.org (search
"WiFi"; then follow "WiFi Hot Spots"; then click "Public Spaces" hyperlink)
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In short, municipal broadband has failed to develop into a
viable competitor to incumbent broadband access providers.
Instead of becoming a substitute, it has become (at most) a
complementary service (e.g., it allows you use your laptop in a
park, but it does not allow you to terminate your cable or DSL
broadband subscription). This state of affairs, however, was not
inevitable, but instead resulted largely from policy choices. And
while there is plenty of blame to go around, I argue that law was
the primary cause of municipal broadband's failure. Simply put,
incumbent broadband providers used law to stifle municipal
broadband in its infancy.
2. The Role ofLaw
The argument that law has stifled municipal broadband is
supported by a rather strong piece of evidence-namely, state laws
that explicitly stifle municipal broadband. These restrictions,
which are described below, have been sharply criticized by
scholars. 10 6 I argue here, however, that scholars' criticisms have
been somewhat misdirected. Specifically, the legislative
restrictions are important for different reasons than the literature
has emphasized. In fact, a close review of these restrictions shows
that they are relatively limited in both scope and number.
Instead, the restrictions' true harm stems from their
signaling effect. Essentially, incumbents have used these laws as
signals that they will increase municipalities' cost of entry into the
broadband market. This signaling not only dissuades municipalities
from entering the market, it persuades them either to adopt
ownership models that are more likely to fail, or to adopt less
ambitious networks that do not pose significant threats to
incumbents.
To provide background, the traditional narrative
adopted by critics of municipal broadband
restrictions begins with the Telecommunications
Act of 19961l 7 and more precisely, with the
106 Matthew Dunne, Let My People Go (Online): The Power of the FCC To
Preempt State Laws That Prohibit Municipal Broadband, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1126, 1138-40 (2007); D. Stan O'Loughlin, Preemption or Bust: Fear and
Loathing in the Battle Over Broadband, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 479, 492-94
(2006) (critiquing the Pennsylvania legislation); Tapia, supra note 88, at 224-25;
Anthony E. Varona, Toward a Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61 ADMIN.
L. REv. 1, 96-100 (2009); HAROLD FELD ET AL., CONNECTING THE PUBLIC: THE
TRUTH ABOUT MUNICIPAL BROADBAND 11-12 (2005), http://www.mediaaccess
.org/MunicipalBroadbandWhitePaper.pdf.
107 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)).
107
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alleged betrayal of the 1996 Act's pro-entry policy
goals. 10 8 One example of these pro-entry provisions
is § 253, which explicitly preempts state and local
barriers to entry in order to promote competition.
The statute reads: "No State or local statute or
regulation, or other State or local legal requirement,
may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications service."
10 9
Immediately after the 1996 Act was adopted, this provision
was put to the test. Several states adopted laws-at the urging of
incumbent telephone companies-to prevent municipalities from
providing "telecommunications services." 110  The laws were
viewed by contemporary skeptics as attempts by well-resourced
incumbent telephone carriers to prevent municipal utilities such as
power companies from entering the telecommunications market.I'
The State of Missouri enacted this type of restriction in
1997.112 In 1998, several municipalities and utility companies in
the state petitioned the FCC to preempt Missouri's law under §
253(a), claiming it represented an unlawful barrier to entry. 113 The
FCC initially rejected the petition, 114 but the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that § 253 preempted the state law.115 In 2004,
however, the Supreme Court reversed in Nixon v. Municipal
League.116 The Court held that, although § 253(a) preempted laws
that prohibited "any entity" from entering the market, the term
"any entity" did not encompass municipal governments. 117
108 FELD ET AL., supra note 106, at 11-12 ("The campaign of the incumbents to
persuade state legislatures to ban municipal networks is directly contrary to the
stated policy goals of the federal government.").
109 47 U.S.C. § 253.110 U.S. Telecom Giants Oppose Cities on Web Access, TOTAL TELECOM, Nov.
23, 2004 ("After Congress passed the landmark Telecom Act in 1996, ...
several municipalities, including some municipal power companies, sought to
offer telephone service. After extensive lobbying by the Bell telephone
companies, roughly a dozen states passed laws prohibiting municipalities from
offering telecommunications services.").
111 Steven C. Carlson, A Historical, Economic, and Legal Analysis of Municipal
Ownership of the Information Highway, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 1,
51-53 (1999) (describing legislative restrictions adopted in Missouri, Nevada,
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).
112 MO. REv. STAT. § 392.410 (1997).
113 Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re The Missouri Municipal League, 16
FCC Rcd. 1157, 1157-58 (2000).
114 Id. at 1158.
115 Mo. Mun. League v. FCC, 299 F.3d 949, 951 (8th Cir. 2002).
116 541 U.S. 125, 128-29 (2004).
117 Id. The Court emphasized the practical difficulties of applying preemption to
local governments, who are in many respects indistinguishable from the state
2009-2010
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The significance of Nixon, then, is that the Court both
upheld the legality of the states' post-1996 Act restrictions on
municipal entry, and opened the door for new legislative
restrictions. Nixon's significance was not lost on state legislatures,
nor upon incumbent carriers. Seizing the opportunity Nixon
provided, incumbent carriers immediately launched an intensive
lobbying effort in multiple states to enact further restrictions on
municipal entry into the broadband market. 118 Several states
ultimately enacted new restrictions, while others came very close
to doing so.' 1 9 These restrictions came at a critical, and vulnerable,
time for municipal broadband. Indeed, at the very moment most
municipal broadband projects were being proposed and financed,
Nixon had handed incumbent carriers a potent new weapon to stifle
them.
The actual scope of these new restrictions varied in
severity, but they all effectively raised the costs for municipalities
to provide broadband service. 20 Some states, such as Nebraska,
flatly banned municipal broadband. 12 1 The more common
approach, however, was to raise entry costs by requiring
municipalities to meet various procedural requirements before they
could offer service. These requirements included everything from
seeking the permission of the local incumbent (Pennsylvania), 122 to
developing elaborate business plans (Florida), 123 to holding local
referenda prior to initiating a project (Louisiana and Colorado).
124
itself. For instance, local governments could not benefit from preemption unless
it could "point to some law authorizing it to run a utility in the first place." Id. at
133-34.
118 FELD ET AL., supra note 106, at 11 ("[Following Nixon,] lobbyists for the
incumbent cable and telecom industries have descended on state capitols.");
Varona, supra note 106, at 98 ("[Nixon] emboldened cable and telephone
broadband carriers to enforce existing anticompetitive state statutes and pursue
new enactments in states without such statutes."); see also LOCALITIES
WEIGHING BROADBAND CONFRONT MORE STATE BILLS To BAN THEIR ENTRY,
STATE TELEPHONE REGULATION REPORT (2005) (describing legislative efforts in
Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, Florida, and Texas).
119 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 84, at 3 ("At least eight of those nineteen
states passed such legislation in the 2004-2006 period; similar bills were
introduced in at least nine other states during that time.").
120 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 84, at 38-40 (outlining various categories of
restrictions); Michael H. Botein, Regulation of Municipal Wi-Fi, 51 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 974, 983-85 (2006); see also Tapia & Ortiz, supra note 88, at 4-6
(same).
121 NEB. REv. STAT. § 86-594 (2009); Jeffrey Silva & Heather F. Weaver, Bill
Would Ban Cities from Offering Telecom Systems, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, June
13, 2005, at 6.
122 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3014(h) (2009).
123 FLA. STAT. § 350.81 (2009).
124 LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45:844.50 (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-27-201
(2009).
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Other restrictions were placed upon funding mechanisms. The state
of Florida, for instance, imposed various financial limitations such
as prohibiting cross-subsidies, and requiring project revenues to
ultimately cover operating costs.
125
Estimates vary, but the most recent government statistics
provide that nineteen state legislatures have enacted some sort of
barrier to entry on municipal broadband. 126 These same reports
note that an additional sixteen state legislatures have at least
considered bills that would impose further restrictions. 127
Although scholars and activists have criticized these
restrictions, 128 the restrictions themselves are not as severe and
widespread as the literature describes. For one, the restrictions only
apply in roughly a third of the states, even assuming the most
common estimates are correct (as I explain below, they are likely
overstated). While this number is problematic, most states have not
enacted these restrictions. The failures of municipal broadband,
however, are national-they are not limited to those states that
adopted restrictions.
In addition, scholars have generally overstated the scope of
these legislative restrictions. Indeed, several of the state laws never
applied to broadband, or stopped applying after the FCC
reclassified broadband access as an "information service," which
the Supreme Court upheld in the Brand X case. 129 This regulatory
125 FLA. STAT. § 350.81(2)(f).
126 These numbers vary both because of date, and because of different
calculation methods. See, e.g., Varona, supra note 106, at 96 & n.470 (listing
restrictive statutes in "at least fifteen" states); FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N,
BRINGING BROADBAND TO RURAL AMERICA: REPORT ON A RURAL BROADBAND
STRATEGY 53 n.308 (2009) ("[A]t least 19 states have enacted legislation
specifically addressing municipal broadband.") [hereinafter 2009 RURAL
BROADBAND REPORT]; 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 84, at 3 ("At least
nineteen states have some kind of legislation that defines the extent to which
municipalities may provide Internet service.").
127 2009 RURAL BROADBAND REPORT, supra note 126, at 53 n.308 ("We note
that at least 35 states have considered limiting municipal broadband, and at least
19 states have enacted legislation specifically addressing municipal
broadband."). For a description of some of the failed efforts, see Memorandum
from James Baller, The Baller Herbst Law Group, on Proposed State Barriers to
Public Entry (June 8, 2006), http://www.baller.com/pdfs/Baller Proposed
State Barriers.pdf.
T28 See supra note 106.
129 Nat'l Cable & Telecommcn's Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967 (2005). The FCC has traditionally classified broadband access-the
physical transport of data over physical infrastructure-as a regulated
"telecommunications service." The data services themselves, however, were
classified as deregulated "information services." Today, however, the FCC has
reclassified all broadband access services as "information services." Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, In re Appropriate Framework for
Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,853,
14,857 (2005) ("We ... determine that ...the transmission component of
2009-2010
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reclassification arguably limits the scope of some states'
restrictions on municipal broadband. The reason is that some of
these statutes impose restrictions on "telecommunications
services."13 Prior to Brand X, these provisions would have clearly
applied to municipal broadband access offerings. Today, however,
because these access offerings are considered "information
services" under the 1996 Act, some state statutes may no longer
apply at all.
Arkansas, for instance, is commonly cited in the lists of
states that restrict municipal broadband. 13 1  The Arkansas
prohibition, however, does not seem to apply to broadband. Passed
in 1997 (years before Nixon), it applies only to local exchange
service (i.e., local telephone service). 32 The statutory text does not
explicitly encompass municipal broadband, nor has it prevented
Arkansas cities such as Bentonville and Springdale from
experimenting with municipal WiFi.
133
The larger point here is not to downplay the importance of
the state barriers to entry. To the contrary, I agree with critics who
believe that these restrictions have played a key role in stifling
municipal services. Instead, my point is to explain more precisely
how the restrictions accomplished this entrenchment. Even though
the state restrictions may be limited in both number and scope,
they nonetheless remain important for their signaling effects.
Specifically, incumbents' signals have created a credible threat that
municipal entry will be opposed, and thus will be more expensive
to construct. 134 In this respect, the proposed legislation has
arguably been as consequential as the actual enacted restrictions.
135
wireline broadband Internet access is not a telecommunications service.");
Declaratory Ruling, In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband
Access to the Internet over Wireless Networks, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5901 (2007)
(wireless). For a good general discussion of the regulatory history, see S. DEREK
TURNER, DISMANTLING DIGITAL DEREGULATION: TOWARD A NATIONAL
BROADBAND STRATEGY 33-36 (2009).
130 Mo. REV. STAT. § 392.410(7) ("No political subdivision of this state shall
provide ... a telecommunications service . . . ."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-9-2600
(2008) ("This article regulates the provision of telecommunications service...");
TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 51.002, 54.201-.202 (2009) (phrasing restrictions on
utilities defined in terms of "telecommunications service"). But see S.C. CODE
ANN. § 58-9-2200 (defining "telecommunications service" more broadly than
federal law).
131 See, e.g., Varona, supra note 106, at 97 & n.470; 2009 RURAL BROADBAND
REPORT, supra note 126, at 53 n.308.
132 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-17-409(b)(1) (2009).
133 Richard Massey, More Cities Offering Wi-Fi Outlets, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, May 28, 2007.
134 For instance, the Utah Senate's bill proposing to restrict municipalities'
ability to borrow money for networks came a crucial time, and arguably played a
role in persuading Salt Lake City officials not to join a municipal fiber
consortium. Zack Van Eyck, Three More Cities Back UTOPIA, DESERET
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The implicit threat of opposing municipal broadband can
have effects even in states without municipal restrictions. Julio
Ortiz and Andrea Tapia describe these effects as "phantom
legislation."' 136 They explain:
We have coined the term phantom legislation to
describe the actions taken by these cities within
states that have no current restrictive legislation. By
phantom legislation, we mean legislation enacted in
one jurisdiction, which may have power to
influence the behavior of organizations in other
jurisdictions even though there is no legal
requirement to do so.
37
These legislative threats have been compounded by the
litigation and regulatory challenges that incumbent providers have
filed against individual municipal projects (often simultaneously
with legislative efforts). 138 Interestingly, these challenges have
been particularly intense when municipalities have proposed new
fiber networks. 139 One of the most well-known examples is
BellSouth's legal attack on Lafayette's proposed municipal fiber
network.
140
Here, the city of Lafayette announced plans to significantly
expand an existing fiber network, following years of frustrations
with incumbent providers. The project, however, was held up for
years in litigation directly primarily by BellSouth, which attacked
various aspects of the project's capital and operations funding.
141
MORNING NEWS, Feb. 9. 2004 ("The [proposed] bill would prevent cities from
doing exactly what UTOPIA is trying to do now-borrow money inexpensively
by pledging future sales tax revenues.").
135 The failures of many of these bills to get enacted is therefore only a mixed
success. For a description of some of these failed legislative efforts, see Cathy
Swirbul, State Broadband Battles, AM. PUB. POWER MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at
24-32, http://www.appanet.org/newsletters/ppmagazinedetail.cfi?ItemNumber-
17441.
136 Andrea H. Tapia & Julio Angel Ortez, Policy and Plan Convergence for
Municipal Broadband Networks 14 (2007).
137 Id
138 Telecom Carrier Court Tactics Slow Municipal Wi-Fi, ST. TELPHONE REG.
REP., Aug. 8, 2008 ("Telecom companies are using varied tactics in a growing
number of lawsuits aimed at stopping or slowing municipal wireless and
broadband projects in small and midsized cities.").
139 Michael J. Santorelli, Rationalizing the Municipal Broadband Debate, 3
INFO. Soc'Y J.L. & POL'Y 43, 65-66 (2007) ("[I]n the few cases where [these]
municipal broadband projects have been proposed, they have attracted vehement
reactions from incumbent service providers.").
140 Id
141 State Telecom Activities, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 8, 2005. For the general
factual history, see generally the Louisiana Supreme Court case that ultimately
2009-2010
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After years of litigation, and multiple adverse rulings in the
intermediate appellate court, the Louisiana Supreme Court finally
dismissed the challenges in 2007, thus allowing the network to
proceed.
142
Other proposed fiber networks have faced similar
challenges from local incumbents. The project proposed by the city
of Bristol, for instance, was contested both in court and before the
state of Virginia's administrative agency. 143 Bristol ultimately
prevailed, but not before being required to do expensive cost
studies and to incur other costs.
144
In Utah, the incumbent provider Qwest adopted a different
approach. A consortium of cities had agreed to collaborate on a
municipal fiber project, known as Utah Telecommunication Open
Infrastructure Agency or UTOPIA.145  Qwest, however,
successfully lobbied the government of Salt Lake City (the state's
largest city) to stay out of the consortium. 146 It also subsequently
sued the consortium, claiming that it improperly used Qwest's
utility poles and that it represented unfair competition. 1
47
The combined strategies of legislation and litigation
havelimited the competitive potential of municipal broadband in
several important respects. First, many of the laws imposed
substantive limits and even prohibitions on the services. While
many of these restrictions are not as strict as the literature often
assumes, the restrictions are nonetheless real in many cases.
Second, raising the costs of entry caused municipalities to
adopt projects that were less threatening to incumbents. Some
cities like Miami and Chicago have scaled their projects down to a
series of wireless hot spots.148 Others have increasingly begun
pursuing options with the local incumbents themselves (or their
affiliates) to provide public-sponsored wireless broadband.
149
More interestingly, however, the incumbents' threats have
caused municipalities to shift not only to less threatening networks,
but to less threatening ownership models for their proposed
allowed the project to proceed, Naquin v. Lafayette City-Parish Consolidated
Government, 950 So. 2d 657 (La. 2007).
142 Id. at 659.
143 BALHOFF & ROWE, LLC, supra note 86, at 41-43.
144 Id.
145 Id at 43-46; Utah, ST. TELEPHONE REG. REP., June 17, 2005 (outlining
allegations in Qwest suit against UTOPIA).
146 David Passmore, Truly Neutral Nets, Bus. COMm. REV., Sept. 1, 2006
("Significant opposition to UTOPIA emerged from Qwest (the incumbent telco),
which managed to keep Salt Lake City from joining.").
147 BALHOFF & ROWE, LLC, supra note 86, at 43-46.
148 See supra text accompanying notes 104-105.
149 Amol Sharma, Companies That Fought Cities on Wi-Fi, Now Rush To Join
In, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2006.
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projects. "Ownership model" is a broad term that refers to how
municipalities have chosen to fund, build, and offer their services.
Policymakers and scholars have identified several types of
ownership models, and have provided detailed descriptions of
these various models and their costs and benefits.
150
For purposes here, however, the key point is that certain
ownership models are more inherently threatening to incumbents
than others. Consider, for instance, the model of pure government
ownership. Under this model, the government (or its utility)
constructs its own network and then acts like a retail Internet
service provider that competes with local incumbents. 15 1 One of
the most well-known municipal fiber projects-Lafayette-
adopted this model. Unsurprisingly, it has also faced some of the
most intense legal challenges.
152
A less threatening type of ownership model is the "public-
private" partnership model. Here, the government's involvement is
much less involved. The extent of government involvement can
vary-for instance, the private provider might own and operate the
network, while the government might provide rights-of-way or
negotiate lower rates. 153 Regardless of its exact form, the public-
private model poses far fewer risks to municipalities and taxpayer
revenues. The largest municipal broadband projects tended to
adopt this model. 154 Houston and Philadelphia, for instance,
contracted with Earthlink in public-private partnerships.
Public-private ownership models, however, are inherently
less threatening to incumbents in several respects. Most
importantly, public-private partnerships shift risks and expenses to
private capital. The companies most able to bear these risks are
large incumbent providers that already have extensive
infrastructure and a large customer base. They are therefore
obvious candidates to win the contracts, and they have had more
success on that front in recent years.1
55
Even when incumbents do not win the contract, however,
public-private ownership models still poses less of a threat because
they are unlikely to succeed when smaller companies assume these
risks. Indeed, one of the primary reasons why the major municipal
projects failed was because the cities shifted too much risk upon
smaller private companies with less infrastructure and revenues.
156
150 See, e.g., 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 84, at 13-18 (outlining and defining
various ownership models that municipalities have adopted).
151 Id. at 17.
152 Santorelli, supra note 139, at 65-66.
153 2006 FTC REPORT, supra note 84, at 15-16.
154 Id
155 Sharma, supra note 149.
156 Tim Wu, Where's My Free Wi-Fi? Why Municipal Wireless Networks Have
Been Such a Flop, SLATE, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2174858.
2009-2010
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Earthlink, for instance, was an extremely risky foundation on
which to base such large capital projects. It lacked the resources of
incumbent providers such as AT&T and Verizon (and their
wireless affiliates).
The larger point here is that law heavily influenced the
decision to adopt ownership models that were inherently less
stable. By raising the costs of entry through threats of legislation
and litigation, incumbents created incentives for municipalities to
outsource the risk to private companies. Ortiz and Tapia have
recently provided some empirical support for this claim,
documenting that one of the most common municipal responses to
legislative efforts to block entry was to shift to a public-private
ownership model.
157
In sum, law played a significant role in the decline of
municipal broadband. Although the state legislative restrictions are
the most obviously culprit, they stifled municipal broadband in
different ways than the literature has generally stressed.
C. VoIP
Voice-over-Internet-Protocol, or VoIP, is essentially a
phone service that works over an Internet connection. It transmits
human voices by converting them into digital packets and then
routing them like any other data over standard Internet protocols.
Critically, VoIP services allow consumers to send calls to-and
receive calls from-the traditional phone network. To provide this
service, however, VoIP systems must "interconnect" with the
traditional network in various places. As explained below, this
need for interconnection ultimately rendered VolP companies
vulnerable to legal attacks by incumbent telephone and wireless
carriers.
In analyzing these issues, this Section focuses primarily on
"independent" VoIP, which refers to VoIP companies who do not
own the underlying broadband access infrastructure that carries
their service.158 Cable companies, by contrast, offer VoIP over
their own "last mile" facilities. 159 While incumbent cable
companies are currently the main source of VoIP's growth (as
opposed to independent VoIP), this Section argues that
157 Tapia & Ortiz, supra note 136, at 14.
158 These services are also known as "over the top" VoIP. See Memorandum
Opinion and Order, In re SBC Commc'ns, Inc. & AT&T Corp. Applications for
Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290, 18,338 (2005) ("This
type includes those providers that require the end user to obtain broadband
transmission from a third-party provider ....").
159 Id. at 18,337 ("[W]e define facilities-based VoIP providers, such as certain
cable VoIP providers, as providers that own and control the last mile facility
.... 11).
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independent VoIP could have been a much more disruptive
technology than it is today.
1. The Rise and Fall of Independent VoIP
A few years back, VoIP was the hottest thing in town. New
independent VoIP companies like Vonage and SunRocket were
"brave" trailblazers that represented the wave of the future. 160 In
2004, FCC Commissioner Copps hailed VoIP as the "new and hot
and disruptive technology of the moment."
161
Contemporary scholars echoed this excitement, and
celebrated VoIP's disruptive potential. Using terms like
"revolutionary," scholars and journalists explained that VoIP could
help usher in a "fundamental transformation in industry structure"
in traditional wireline voice service. 162 Because VoIP operated
over the Internet, it had the power to "bypass" incumbents in voice
markets historically "dominated by regulated monopolies."'
163
Several famous business leaders such as Rupert Murdoch and Meg
Whitman predicted that phone calls would soon be free. 164 Another
writer predicted that "consumers will pay little or nothing for a
large portion of their voice services by 201 0. 165 It was, in short,
an exciting time for the new technology.
Today, however, the story is much different. Instead of
debating whether VoIP is "revolutionary," the more common
question is whether VoIP is "dead."' 166 Independent VoIP
companies like SunRocket have gone out of business since the
160 Tim Wu, The Broadband Debate, A User's Guide, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 69, 71-72 (2004) ("But everyone was watching the wrong
companies, for where broadband operators were timid, a company named
Vonage was brave.").
161 Michael J. Copps, Disruptive Technology... Disruptive Regulation, 2005
MICH. ST. L. REV. 309, 311. To their credit, both Wu and Copps warned that
VoIP's success will also depend on policy.
162 Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks as
Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1687, 1688
(2005) (stating that VoIP has helped render "a sector that has long been
dominated by regulated monopolies more competitive than ever before");
Stephen H. Wildstrom, At Last, You Can Ditch the Phone Company,
BUSiNESSWEEK, May 17, 2004 ("We are going through a telecommunications
revolution. . . . The disruptive technology-voice over Internet protocol
(VOIP)-simply uses data networks to deliver voice conversations.").
163 Spulber & Yoo, supra note 162, at 1688.
164 Mark C. Del Bianco, Voices Past: The Present and Future of VoIP
Regulation, 14 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 365, 371-72 (2006) (discussing
business leaders' predictions).
165 Id
166 See, e.g., Om Malik, VoIP: Dead or Alive?, GIGAOM, Jan. 1, 2009,
http://gigaom.com/2009/01/0 1/voip-dead-or-alive (criticizing those who
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heady days of 2004.167 Skype has had more success, but even it
will soon be spun off by eBay, and intellectual property fights
loom over potential buyers. 168 The largest and most famous
company-Vonage-has been on the verge of bankruptcy for
years.
In short, it appears that independent VoIP companies are no
longer viable competitors to incumbent services. Instead, the
growth in VoIP services has primarily come from large incumbent
cable (and, to a lesser extent, telephone) companies that own their
own last-mile facilities. While the competition between incumbent
cable and telephone companies in the voice market is an important
development, it is hardly the sort of structural revolution that
seemed possible just a few years earlier.
2. The Role ofLaw
Several causes have contributed to the downfall of
independent VoIP companies. Many of the companies made poor
business decisions. Vonage's IPO, for instance, was famously
bungled, and led to a shareholder suit. 169 As Professor Susan
Crawford has written, new VoIP companies were also saddled with
legacy regulatory requirements that imposed unnecessary costs.17
0
I argue, however, that the most significant cause was patent
law-and in particular, the patent litigation against Vonage, the
largest independent VoIP company. As I show, Vonage became a
proxy for independent VoIP more generally in that the attacks on
Vonage were viewed as having implications on the viability of
independent VoIP. 171
To provide context, the patent litigation against Vonage
stemmed from the company's need to interconnect with the
traditional telephone network. Although Vonage services operate
over a customer's broadband connection, Vonage customers must
reach telephones that are not connected to the Internet.
Accordingly, Vonage's service must be able to interface with the
167 Adam Bender, Vonage Narrows Losses, but Churn Hurt by Verizon
Litigation, 'Inconsistent' Service, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 10, 2007 (discussing
SunRocket's failure).
168 Brad Stone, eBay Plans Public Offering for Skype, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/15/technology/companies/15skype.html.
169 See infra pp. 31-32.
170 Crawford, supra note 9, at 883-84 ("One key market-protection move is to
pile destructive regulations on new competitors.").
171 Adam Bender, AT&T Joins Crowd Filing Patent Suits Against Vonage,
COMM. DAILY, Oct. 23, 2007 ("An AT&T lawsuit against Vonage may be more
a strategic move to hurt the top independent VoIP carrier than a 'me too' case
following Verizon's and Sprint's legal success"); Ian Martinez, Verizon Patent
Win Could Cripple Vonage, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 9, 2007 ("Vonage and
independent VoIP providers in general took a hit in this case, [analysts said].").
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traditional telephone network to complete these calls. Without this
interconnection ability, Vonage would be at a tremendous
competitive disadvantage because its service would not reach most
of the country's wireline and wireless phones. This interconnection
required not only physical hardware connection, but also software
connections that, among other things, translated and processed
traditional phone numbers in order to route calls.
The ultimate patent litigation against Vonage focused
primarily on these interconnection points. Beginning in 2006,
Verizon, Sprint, and AT&T (which are all large incumbent
carriers) filed multi-million dollar patent infringement claims
against upstart Vonage. The Verizon and Sprint claims focused on
various patents covering technology that facilitated interconnection
with the traditional telephone network. 172 The AT&T claim, by
contrast, focused on technology that allowed consumers to use
standard phone devices to make VoIP calls.
173
The stakes of the litigation could not have been higher for
Vonage. Indeed, for much of 2007, it was unclear whether the
company would survive. 174 The most significant danger Vonage
faced was a potential injunction ordering it to halt service. 175 In
fact, this threat was far from hypothetical. Following an initial
order finding that Vonage had infringed Verizon's patents, a
federal district court issued an injunction that would have
(devastatingly) required Vonage to halt its service. Before the
injunction could take effect, though, the court issued a partial stay,
but still prohibited Vonage from signing up new customers.
176
Although the Federal Circuit ultimately granted a full stay, 177 the
threat of a new injunction (in either the Verizon or Sprint
172 Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself
Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 372-73
(2008) ("The bulk of the patents [in the Verizon dispute] were for
interconnection techniques."); Edie Herman, Vonage to Appeal Jury Verdict in
Sprint Patent Case, COMM. DAILY, Sept. 26, 2007 ("The six patents are for
technology that helps connect VoIP traffic to the public switched network.").
173 Brad Reed, Vonage Reaches Tentative Settlement with AT&T, NETWORK
WORLD, Nov. 8, 2007.
174 Leslie Cauley, Is Vonage's Time Running Out? Firm Says No, but Some
Analysts Think Patent Ruling Could Be End, USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2007; Jim
Duffy, Sprint Suit vs. Vonage Expected, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 13, 2007 ("If
Vonage loses the suit with Sprint in addition to the recent loss with Verizon, this
causes us to wonder whether Vonage will be able to survive .... ").
175 Adam Bender, SunRocket Suit Is "Noise," but Other Cases Could Kill
Vonage, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 1, 2007 (discussing potential harm of injunctions
to Vonage's business).
176 Ian Martinez, Real Partial Stay Entered in Verizon Case, as Vonage CEO
Steps Down, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 13, 2007 (describing district court procedural
history).
177 Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 228 Fed. App'x 986 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 24, 2007) (unpublished table decision) (granting full stay).
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litigations) loomed heavy throughout 2007, and would have likely
been fatal.
Even though Vonage dodged the injunction bullet,
unfavorable court decisions ultimately forced it to pay large
settlements, which further threatened its financial viability. 78 In
late September 2007, Vonage suffered two unfavorable decisions
almost simultaneously-a jury in Kansas City found that Vonage
had infringed various Sprint patents, 179 and the Federal Circuit
upheld most of the district court's earlier ruling that Vonage had
infringed Verizon's patents. 180 News of these decisions drove
Vonage's stock to around one dollar, its historic low at the time.
The decisions also triggered liquidity concerns and put the
company's future in doubt.
181
Vonage has managed to survive the litigation, but
permanent damage was done both to Vonage and to independent
VoIP more generally. In addition to the sheer amount of damages
Vonage had to pay, the litigation sent a significant and cautionary
signal to the market. Like all new startups, independent VoIP
companies relied on attracting investors. The litigation, however,
substantially increased the risks of investing in any independent
VoIP company. Indeed, Verizon filed its litigation almost
immediately after Vonage went public. 182 The lack of investment
plagues Vonage even today. In July 2009, Vonage was trading at
around thirty-sevent cents-a sharp fall from the glory days of
2006.183
There are, of course, other potential explanations for
Vonage's struggles (and those of independent VoIP more
generally). The first is simply that Vonage offered an inferior
product. The company was plagued, for instance, by service
quality complaints and by the inability to bundle voice with other
services like cable or broadband the way incumbent providers
178 Wireline, COMM. DAILY, Nov. 16, 2007 (outlining amounts of settlements
and stating that Vonage "soon may face a liquidity crisis").
179 Edie Herman, Vonage To Appeal Jury Verdict in Sprint Patent Case, COMM.
DAILY, Sept. 26, 2007.
180 Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1298 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
181 Wireline, COMM. DAILY, Oct. 29, 2007 ("Vonage has a 'mounting liquidity
issue' after coming to terms in a VoIP patent dispute with Verizon."); see also
Kevin Werbach, Connections: Beyond Universal Service in the Digital Age, 7 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 67, 89 (2009) ("Several companies, beginning
with Verizon, successfully sued the VoIP startup Vonage for infringing their
patents, nearly forcing Vonage out of business.").
182 Ian Martinez, Verizon Sues Vonage over VoIP Patents, WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, June 20, 2006.
183 Vonage initially opened at around thirteen dollars per share, but quickly
leveled off to around seven dollars per share for most of 2006.
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could. 184 In addition, Vonage's IPO was sharply criticized by
financial analysts and led almost immediately to a shareholder suit
following an initial decline in stocks. 18 5 A separate potential
explanation has been raised by Susan Crawford, who argued that
VoIP has been unnecessarily saddled with various regulations
including intrusive E9 11, CALEA, and universal service
compliance requirements.
186
While these problems certainly contributed to Vonage's
problems, the patent litigation threat posed a more serious and
even existential threat. The strongest evidence for this argument is
simply timing-in short, Vonage's most serious signs of weakness
tended to correlate closely in time with Vonage's fortunes in the
patent litigation.
Consider, for instance, Vonage's trading price. Although
Vonage's stock dropped immediately after its public offering, its
price had held steady between $6 and $7 for months. Vonage's
stock dropped sharply, however, in March 2007-from $5.22 on
March 2 to $3 by March 23.187 Although Vonage had recently
released an unfavorable earnings report in February, the stock only
spiraled downward after an unfavorable patent decision came
down on March 8, 2007.188 In addition, Vonage's CEO resigned in
April, on the very same day the federal district court announced
that it would institute a partial injunction barring Vonage from
using technology that infringed on Verizon patents. 1
89
During this same time, Vonage had actually received a
favorable decision from the Eighth Circuit in late March, which
upheld the FCC's preemption of state legacy regulation of VoIP. 190
The market, however, did not seem to care. Patent rights went to
the very heart of Vonage's operations, and losing these rights was
184 See Laurie J. Flynn, Vonage Posts Smaller Loss but Says Subscriber Growth
Is Off, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2007.
185 Mariam Fain, Verizon, Vonage Rumble over Patents; Web-Phone Firms
Fear Suit May Spur Others, Curb Industry's Growth, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22,
2007, at B4 (noting Vonage's "botched" IPO); Yuki Noguchi, Vonage
Shareholders File Lawsuit over IPO, TECHNEWS, June 6, 2006.
186 See generally Crawford, supra note 9.
187 Vonage Hit with Injunction in Verizon Case, NETWORK WORLD, Mar. 23,
2007 (noting the fall in Vonage's stock price).
188 Jury Says Vonage Violated Verizon Patents, WASH. TELECOM NEWSWIRE,
Mar. 8, 2007.
189 Martinez, supra note 176.
190 Court Upholds FCC VoIP Order Against PUC Challenge, WASH. TELECOM
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 21, 2007 (noting favorable Eighth Circuit decision preempting
state regulation of VoIP).
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therefore a much more pressing concern than the potential
imposition of state regulations.
19 1
The next sharp drop in Vonage's stock came in late
September. The trigger here was back-to-back unfavorable
decisions in both the Verizon and the Sprint cases. In the latter, a
jury found that Vonage had infringed six of Sprint's patents on
September 25, 2007. The next day, the Federal Circuit partially
upheld the patent infringement decision. The decisions renewed
speculation about Vonage's future.1
92
Although Vonage is only one company, it was generally
seen as a proxy for independent VoIP. Throughout 2007, analysts
routinely used the attacks on Vonage to speculate on the future of
independent VolP. 193 Admittedly, these companies had certain
market disadvantages, particularly the lack of physical
infrastructure. In time, perhaps the ultimate result would have been
the same even without the patent litigation. The point, however, is
that independent VoIP never really got a chance to compete. Patent
litigation crippled it in its infancy. In doing so, patent law forced
VoIP to develop in a different way-in particular, it channeled
VoIP toward larger existing providers such as incumbent cable
companies.
D. OBJECTIONS
This Part has argued that legal and regulatory choices have
limited the competitive potential of various broadband and
broadband access services. One obvious objection is that this
narrative underplays the role of market forces and the superior
business models of the more successful companies. As noted
above, one could argue that independent VoIP and municipal
broadband were hurt not so much by law, but by their inability to
provide multiple service "bundles" to customers.
194
Another objection is that the success of companies like
Verizon Wireless and AT&T Mobility stem from their innovations
and investments. Both companies have invested substantial
amounts in higher-speed 3G networks. AT&T has also benefited
191 Cauley, supra note 174 ("The patented technology goes to the heart of
Vonage's business, which hinges on its ability to provide high-quality Internet
phone calls.").
192 Adam Bender, Vonage Unfazed as Court Upholds Verizon Infringement,
COMM. DAILY, Sept. 27, 2007 (describing both cases).
193 Fai, supra note 185 ("The case is closely watched by the nascent Web-
calling industry, with some experts saying that a ruling against Vonage could
encourage more patent suits in the telecom world.").
194 Flynn, supra note 184 (noting Vonage's inability to provide bundles of
services).
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from its savvy decision to partner with Apple on the iPhone, which
has proven extremely popular and profitable. 1
95
It would be foolish, of course, to argue that these factors
were wholly irrelevant. Complex trends like these always have
multiple causes. The question is necessarily one of degree. There
are, however, several reasons to believe that legal choices were the
primary driving force behind these various developments.
The strongest evidence, arguably, is simply the timing of
these various developments, which followed specific legal actions
very closely in time. The consolidation of the wireless industry, for
instance, rapidly increased following the spectrum cap repeal in
2003 and the deregulation of special access two years earlier.
Many of the individual wireless companies cited these specific
developments in getting acquired to larger carriers. Alltel, for
instance, was purchased by Verizon following its inability to
obtain more spectrum in the 700 MHz auction.
196
I have already discussed the close correlation in time
between Vonage's various woes and negative developments in the
patent litigation developments. This same correlation, however,
exists with respect to municipal broadband. Both the collapses-
and the shifts in ownership models-occurred very closely in time
to the legislative and legal challenges against municipal
broadband.
Further evidence of law's primary role can be seen in the
trend toward a duopoly of national wireless carriers. It is not
merely that a duopoly is emerging, but that this particular
duopoly-the two affiliates of the largest Bells-is emerging.
Given that low frequency spectrum and special access
infrastructure are critical inputs, it is not surprising that the two
affiliates of AT&T and Verizon have emerged as the dominant
carriers. Not only do AT&T Mobility and Verizon Wireless benefit
from the special access holdings of their affiliates, they also
possess the bulk of the low-frequency spectrum initially allocated
to the wireline companies.
197
Finally, one could argue that consolidation does not
actually pose a threat to broadband deployment at all, particularly
within the wireless industry. Larger carriers, for instance, would
argue that consolidation has enabled them to deploy higher-speed
broadband more aggressively through great efficiencies and
195 Alex Pham, Apple Is Unhurt by Hard Times, First-Quarter Profit Jumps
15% as Sales of iPhones, iPods Surge, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at B1.
196 Howard Buskirk, Verizon-Alltel Merger Faces Tough Fight at FCC,
Congressional Scrutiny, COMM. DAILY, June 6, 2008 ("Alltel's failure to obtain
700 MHz licenses 'crippled' its capacity to 'break out' as a national competitor,
Harold Feld, senior vice president of the Media Access Project, said ...
197 Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, LLC, supra note 19, at 7-8.
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economies of scale. 198 Consolidation also, the argument goes,
facilitates the development of a truly national network
infrastructure that better serves the public, particularly those who
travel frequently.
While these arguments sound plausible in the abstract, they
have yet to play out in practice. Indeed, as cited above, public
interest organizations have cited both conduct and other data that
seems to reflect an uncompetitive wireless market, with its
attendant consumer harms. 199 In addition, advanced wireless
penetration in the United States lags far behind global leaders such
as Japan and South Korea.200 Further, in judging wireless
broadband deployment, it is important to distinguish between
dense urban areas and the rest of the country, particularly rural
areas. The largest carriers are making investments in denser areas,
but are not developing less dense areas in which they also hold vast
blocks of spectrum. Indeed, the FCC's data obscure this disparate
treatment because it has traditionally considered a county as fully
served even if a carrier serves only part of the county. 20 The fear,
then, is that the largest wireless carriers are warehousing spectrum
in these areas, which poses an entry barrier to smaller and midsized
carriers who could provide higher-capacity broadband with more
spectrum.20 2
In addition, the large carriers have been notoriously slow in
deploying next-generation networks that are sufficient to compete
with wireline broadband offerings. The most aggressive effort on
this front thus far are the new WiMax offerings from Sprint and
Clearwire-who, unsurprisingly, are not affiliated with wireline
broadband providers. It is unclear, however, whether this project
will succeed. Already, it has experienced various delays in its
rollout.20 3 And more broadly, Sprint-Clearwire face all the various
198 Comments of AT&T, Inc. at 23, In re Fourteenth Annual Report and
Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile
Serv., WT Docket No. 09-66 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n June 15, 2009) (noting
benefits of consolidation); Richard E. Wiley, "A New Telecom Act" Remarks,
31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 17, 23 (2006) (praising state of competition in admittedly
consolidated market).
199 See supra note 36.
200 BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y, NEXT GENERATION CONNECTIVITY:
A REVIEW OF BROADBAND INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY FROM AROUND
THE WORLD 154 (2009) ("Just as they do in fiber infrastructure, Japan and South
Korea lead the world in 3G penetration as well. Japan has over close to 72 3G
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, and South Korea has 63. By comparison, the
United States has 20.6 3G subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.").
201 Rural Telecomms. Group, Inc., supra note 22, at 8.
202 See, e.g., Buskirk, supra note 15.
203 Allie Winter, Sprint Nextel Set To Roll Out WiMax; U.S. Adoption Rate
Remains To Be Seen, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Sept. 8, 2008 ("Continuous delays
in rolling out the technology have haunted Sprint Nextel.").
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obstacles and barriers to entry outlined above-including lack of
special access infrastructure and lack of low-frequency spectrum.
In sum, while market forces undoubtedly play a role in the
trends toward consolidation, law and regulatory choices have
played an even greater role.
II. THE ROLE OF SIZE IN ENTRENCHING INCUMBENTS
The previous Section established that law has played a
primary role in stifling competitive broadband technologies. This
Section seeks to explain why. Specifically, it examines how and
why law was transformed into an instrument that entrenches
incumbents against competitive threats in these market contexts.
Although there are undoubtedly multiple causes of this
entrenchment, I argue that the primary cause is simply the size of
the incumbents-or more precisely, the relative size of the
incumbents to their potential competitors. Size in and of itself,
however, has not caused entrenchment. Instead, law and size have
intersected in dynamic and mutually reinforcing ways to create
entrenchment effects. It is these dynamic intersections that have
been previously overlooked in the literature, particularly in the
context of new communications technologies.
To illustrate these dynamics, I propose three ways in which
the intersections of law and size have resulted in entrenchment
effects. First, these intersections have led to an increased
concentration of political power, which has in turn allowed
incumbents to reshape law. Second, these intersections have
amplified barriers to entry. Third, I argue that relative size
disparities have implicitly transformed facially neutral legal
doctrines into entrenchment devices.
A. Increased Political Power
One of the traditional progressive critiques of
concentrations of wealth is that it leads to concentrations of
political power. 20 4 For the political process to function properly,
the argument goes, extreme wealth disparities must be avoided.
This argument has deep roots, and was emphasized by progressive
political philosophers like John Rawls.
20 5
204 See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007)
(describing the interplay of political power and wealth concentration).
205 Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax
Policy Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WISC. L.
REV. 1115, 1155 nn.132-33 (discussing John Rawls' preference for taxes to
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A similar concept can be applied to the telecommunications
industry. Extreme disparities in resources within the industry can
lead to concentrations of political power. Size itself, of course,
does not automatically lead to concentrated political power. The
key is relative size.
Once industry consolidation occurs, it can lead to
concentrated political power in various ways. For one, larger
companies simply have more resources. They can therefore donate
more money, hire more (and better) lobbyists, and spend more on
marketing. Consolidation also imposes discipline and order on the
lobbying process. As public choice literature argues, well-
organized and well-resourced interest groups can often secure their
interests better than unorganized and leaderless majorities.
20 6
Consolidation provides the top-down leadership and coordination
that successful lobbying efforts require.
Even more important than size, though, consolidation also
reduces the number of companies within the industry. Size, after
all, is only an advantage in relative terms. If two equally-sized
industries are fighting it out in the legislative arena, their
respective sizes become irrelevant because they "cancel" each
other out. Consolidation, however, can remove these potential
political rivals from the dispute.
Interestingly, James Madison's "theory of the big republic"
has some relevance on this point. In particular, it helps illustrate
why reducing the number of rival companies can affect the quality
of the legislative process.
As first year law students learn, Madison's contribution to
political philosophy was that larger republics actually enhance
stability.2°7 The contemporary fear had been that "factions" would
inevitably tear republics apart by seeking private gain rather than
public good. Madison, however, argued that the answer to this
problem was to increase the number of factions by expanding the
size of the republic. The idea was that, by multiplying the factions,
no single faction would become too powerful. Instead, the factions
would check each other as fluid political coalitions emerged from
issue to issue.2 °8
Under this logic, consolidation removes rival "factions"
from the political debate, which harms the quality of the legislative
process. One good example of how this process plays out can be
206 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54 (1998) ("[A]ccording to
public interest theorists .... the concentrated interests of powerful organized
groups lose out to the diffuse interests of the mostly unorganized citizenry.").
207 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
208 1d; see also Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory
Constrain Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 923, 928 n.17 (2001).
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seen in the recent vertical mergers within the wireline market-
specifically, the SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCI mega-mergers.
20 9
(The former entity ultimately adopted the name "AT&T.")
Prior to the mergers, AT&T and MCI were two of the
largest competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC), and they
competed with the incumbent local exchange carriers (ILEC)
companies SBC and Verizon. 210  Smaller CLECs benefited
enormously from the political lobbying effort and expertise that
these two carriers provided on behalf of the CLEC industry. After
the mergers, however, the Bell ILEC companies not only
integrated these two large rivals, they deprived a rival industry of
two of its strongest political voices. In short, two important
"factions" that had previously "checked" ILECs in the political
sphere had disappeared.
Both of these types of political power concentration-
superior resources and the loss of competing voices-are
illustrated in the municipal broadband and wireless broadband
contexts, respectively.
Beginning with municipal broadband, there are several
examples of how incumbents transformed law merely by
possessing superior resources. The most obvious example is how
explicitly pro-incumbent the text of many legislative restrictions
was. The Pennsylvania statute was particularly egregious in this
respect. In the wake of Philadelphia's proposed WiFi network, the
Pennsylvania legislature (under intense lobbying) passed a law that
actually required competitors to get the permission of the local
incumbent provider (generally Verizon) before offering service.
211
The same is true for the post-1996 Act laws, which flatly
prohibited rival exchange service by a government entity.
2 12
The sheer amount of political donations to defeat municipal
broadband also illustrates these relative power disparities.
Returning to Pennsylvania, the Center for Public Integrity found
that lobbyist donations to Pennsylvania legislators sharply
increased during this time, and that Verizon had donated a large
majority of the money.213 More broadly, intense incumbent
209 Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re SBC Commc'ns, Inc. & AT&T
Corp. Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290
(2005); Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Verizon Commc'ns & MCI, Inc.
Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,433 (2005);
see also Chen, supra note 44, at 1315-16.
210 Kimmelman et al., supra note 35, at 513-14 ("AT&T and MCI were the two
largest non-Bell competitors in the local market .....
211 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3014(h) (2009).
212 See supra text accompanying notes 111-112.




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 12 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol12/iss1/3
DEATH OF THE REVOLUTION: THE LEGAL WAR ON COMPETITIVE
BROADBAND TECHNOLOGIES
lobbying was not unique to Pennsylvania, but extended across the
country.214
The size of the consolidated incumbent industries also
helped them to coordinate efforts and to gain expertise from
legislative battles in other states. Indeed, incumbents lobbied for
municipal broadband restrictions across the nation.215 The national
scope and resources of these companies not only helped them
lobby legislatures in the individual states, they also helped the
companies reinforce the signal nationwide that municipal entry
would be strenuously opposed. Had the incumbents been smaller
and less national in scope, the threat would have been less credible.
After all, the signals were arguably even more important than the
scope of the restrictions.
216
Moving to the wireless industry, its history illustrates how
the loss of rival factions helped incumbents concentrate political
power. The group of wireless carriers that have been most
threatened by consolidation are the midsized carriers. These
carriers generally have extensive regional networks, and are the
companies with the most potential to eventually grow into national
competitors. 217 They are, however, an endangered species. Many
of most well-known midsized carriers have all been acquired in
recent years, including Alltel, Dobson, and Centennial.2 18
Alltel is an especially good example for our purposes in
that it straddled the line between a small national carrier and a
large midsized carrier. On various policy issues, many small and
midsized carriers benefited from Alltel's political and regulatory
efforts. In recent regulatory comments, for instance, the midsized
carrier MetroPCS noted that Alltel had been an important voice on
214 FTC Comr. Blasts Municipal Broadband Opponents, ST. TELEPHONE REG.
REP., Oct. 7, 2005 (noting the "tens of millions" incumbents were spending
nationally to defeat these initiatives).
215 Id
216 Similarly, within the wireless industry, many of the policies here also
resulted from the sheer size advantages of the companies doing the lobbying.
Size, for instance, significantly helped incumbents lobby for more favorable
spectrum rules, such as the lifting of the spectrum caps, which followed
"intense" incumbent lobbying. Benjamin, supra note 40, at 96-97 ("The main
reason for their success is that the wealth they derive from their control of
valuable frequencies not only gives them an incentive to hold onto that spectrum
but also gives them the funds to be effective lobbyists."); Howard Buskirk,
Public Interest Groups, Wireless Disagree in Broadband Comments, COMM.
DAILY, June 10, 2009; Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons,
64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041, 1068 n.146 ("The Cellular Telephone Industry
Association (CTIA), composed of the largest wireless carriers, worked for years
to defeat a spectrum cap that ensured competition by limiting a cellular carrier to
45 MHz bandwidth in each market.").
217 Bender, supra note 21.
218 See supra note 22.
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issues such as roaming reform that are very important to smaller
and midsized carriers.2 19 When Verizon acquired Alltel, however,
it not only removed a business rival, it also removed an important
and well-resourced political voice on various issues.
In sum, the growing relative size has helped increase
incumbents' political power both in terms of sheer resources, and
in removing rival factions or voices from the political debate. This
increased concentration of political power then intersected with,
and transformed, law in various ways that entrenched incumbents
against competitive threats.
B. Amplifying Barriers to Entry
A second way that the intersections of law and size have
entrenched incumbents is through amplifying barriers to entry.
Even assuming that law posed no obstacle to entry, the broadband
access market (like network economies more generally) is already
characterized by significant barriers to entry.220 On the supply side,
communications networks require significant upfront, fixed costs,
but have very low marginal costs.2 21 That means it is expensive to
set them up, but not nearly as expensive to keep them going. This
dynamic leads to economies of scale because an entity's costs
become relatively smaller as providers gain a larger customer base.
Additional barriers to entry exist on the demand side,
largely in the form of network effects, or positive network
externalities. The idea behind network effects is that the value to
the user increases as each additional user joins the network.222
Consider, for instance, the Microsoft Windows platform.2 23 The
software became increasingly valuable as more and more people
adopted it. One result of network effects, then, is that the market
can eventually "tip" into a winner-takes-all monopoly, particularly
if rival services cannot access it or are incompatible with the larger
company. 24 Another example of network effects is the emergence
of the original Bell monopoly. In the early 20th century, customers
219 Comments of MetroPCS Commc'ns, Inc., supra note 77, at 7.
220 For an excellent overview of these barriers, see Richard S. Whitt, Evolving
Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances To Foster Internet Platforms, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 432-36 (2009) (surveying various characteristics
of network markets that make them "resistant to discipline of competition").
221 Id. at 433; William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: A Contrarian View, 7 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 577, 578 (1999) (referring to "high fixed costs" as barrier to
entry).
222 Whitt, supra note 220, at 485.
223 Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 151, 182 (2004) (using Windows as illustration of concept of
network effects).
224 Id. at 182-83.
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in many areas subscribed to alternative and incompatible telephone
services. Thus, some telephone customers could not call other
customers in the same town. Eventually, however, the market
"tipped" in favor of the Bell network, which evolved into a
dominant monopoly service.
225
Industry consolidation has amplified both of these kinds of
barriers. That is, as companies have grown larger, they have
intersected with law in new ways that dynamically reinforce these
barriers and thus increase the costs of entry.
Beginning on the supply side, consolidation significantly
increases the barriers to entry that new entrants already face in the
form of constructing new capital infrastructure, securing rights of
way, and obtaining other required inputs. For instance,
incumbents' vast spectrum holdings raise competitors' costs of
entry by limiting the amount of available usable spectrum, which is
a finite resource. The more that incumbents' relative share of
available spectrum increases, the more that entry costs rise.
Incumbents' control of low-frequency spectrum
exacerbates competitors' capital costs. Recall that low-frequency
waves go further and are more resilient than higher-frequency
waves. With low-frequency spectrum, a carrier can cover more
territory with less capital infrastructure.226 Competitors with
higher-frequency spectrum, by contrast, must construct more
towers and transmission equipment because the waves do not
travel as far.227 Accordingly, even though new wireless
competitors already face daunting upfront fixed costs to enter the
market, the type of spectrum available to them amplifies these
costs.
Incumbents' control of special access infrastructure further
amplifies these costs of entry. The ability to obtain special access
is a vital input, and it is simply impossible for companies to
construct an alternate special access infrastructure in all but the
most densely populated areas. Here, then, the combination of size
of the incumbents' special access holdings with the FCC's decision
to deregulate special access prices has sharply increased entry
costs. As the GAO has documented, deregulated prices have gone
up considerably in the most deregulated regions 22 and this price
increase has disproportionately hurt carriers who are not affiliated
225 PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF
MODERN COMMUNiCATiONS 200-05 (2004).
226 Initial Comments of Frontline Wireless, LLC, supra note 19, at 7-8;
Crawford, supra note 39, at 933 n.242.
227 See supra p. 10.
228 GAO REPORT, supra note 59, at 13-14.
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with wireline companies that own vast amounts of special access
infrastructure.
229
A third example of this dynamic can be seen in the
municipal broadband context. Municipalities that wanted to offer
public networks already faced the daunting fixed startup costs that
any new entrant would face. The legislation protecting large
incumbents, however, increased these costs in various ways. Some
of these laws, for instance, required governments to undertake
burdensome business studies; others required various complex
procedural steps.230 The net effect of these various restrictions,
however, was to increase the costs of entry. Indeed, these
restrictions increased costs even in states that had not adopted any
restrictions (or had adopted more narrow ones). In these states,
incumbents could still effectively raise costs by credibly signaling
that any ambitious proposal for municipal entry would be opposed,
and maybe even tied up in litigation, as many fiber projects have
been.231 And, of course, the larger and more consolidated the
incumbent, the more credible these threats became.
These intersections of size and law have also amplified
barriers to entry on the demand side, as the roaming dispute
illustrates. One of the problems facing any non-national carrier-
particularly rural carriers-is the need to provide service to their
customers when those customers are outside the service area. In
light of network effects and the benefits of being connected to the
larger network, smaller carriers who cannot offer roaming (or
affordable roaming) face a tremendous competitive disadvantage.
Consolidation makes this challenge even more difficult by
dramatically altering bargaining leverage among the parties. 232 In a
world with more providers, smaller and mid-sized carriers can
more easily shop around for roaming partners, and enter into
reciprocal roaming arrangements with them. As the market
increasingly tips toward larger providers, however, those larger
providers have increasingly less need to secure roaming
agreements with smaller carriers. At the same time, though,
smaller carriers have increasingly greater need to secure roaming
agreements with their larger competitors.
229 See Buskirk, supra note 21 (noting criticisms that "[s]pecial access prices
present a barrier to growth").
230 See supra text accompanying notes 119-124.
231 See supra p. 22.
232 See Jeffrey Silva, Consolidation Presses Roaming Issues; Congress, Smaller
Carriers Fear Unreasonable Requirements, RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Jul. 7, 2008
(noting statement of smaller carriers that "[c]onsolidation in the wireless
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For this reason, roaming regulations become increasingly
important as carriers get larger and fewer, particularly considering
that certain carriers have incompatible digital standards. 233 Indeed,
that is exactly why roaming became one of the most controversial
issues surrounding Verizon's acquisition of Alltel.234 Alltel had
traditionally provided roaming services to several small and
midsized carriers (in both formats), and the latter feared they
would lose these roaming agreements after the acquisition.
2 35
In sum, the dynamic reinforcement of size and law is quite
evident in the roaming context. As carriers get larger and fewer,
roaming arrangements become increasingly important. At the same
time, however, the data and in-market exceptions make it
increasingly more difficult for smaller carriers to obtain roaming
agreements. The two forces working together-size and law-have
amplified entry costs, and therefore limited competitive threats to
incumbents.
C. Implicit Doctrinal Transformation
The final way in which these intersections can create
entrenchment effects is through what I call "implicit doctrinal
transformation." The idea here is that disparities in size and
resources can intersect with facially neutral laws in ways that
implicitly transform the law into entrenchment devices. The
municipal broadband restrictions do not belong in this category
because they explicitly discriminate against municipal entry. The
laws I examine here, by contrast, are neutral as written.
Incumbent carriers' patent litigation against Vonage
provides one example of this implicit transformation. The near-
death of Vonage was caused not by patent law alone, but by the
intersection of the size of the incumbent carriers with patent law.
This disparity in size and resources between the parties implicitly
transformed patent law into an incumbent-entrenching mechanism.
To provide some background, scholars and journalists have
recently voiced criticisms of large companies' alleged abuse of
233 See Planned AT&T Buy of Centennial Could Show Changing Merger
Policies, COMM. DAILY, Jan. 21, 2009 (explaining that carriers were concerned
because Centennial was "the last remaining GSM carrier to have an appreciable
facility footprint that AT&T does not cover").
234 Jeffrey Silva, In-Market Roaming Debate Hangs over Carrier Mergers,
RCR WIRELESS NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008 (discussing debate over data exception as
well).
235 Howard Buskirk, Public Interest Groups Ask FCC To Block Verizon
Wireless Buy of Alltel, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 13, 2008 (describing smaller
carriers' reliance on Alltel for roaming services).
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their patent portfolios.236 The basic argument is that larger
companies often create portfolios of weak patents to threaten new
competitors. For instance, Stuart Graham and Ted Sichelman
write: "Even knowing that their patents may be weak, large
companies can often exploit them in strategic fashion to prevent
competition from upstarts."
237
This strategy only works, however, if the other party also
lacks an extensive patent portfolio. Otherwise, patent infringement
plaintiffs would face expensive counter-claims. In essence,
companies with equally extensive patent portfolios deter litigation
through the threat of mutually assured destruction, or at least
mutually assured expensive litigation. This dynamic is arguably
why high-profile patent litigation between incumbent telephone
and cable companies has been limited. Cable companies "are less
vulnerable . . . because they are likely to have developed deep
patent portfolios which they can use defensively to deter an
infringement suit."
238
The Vonage litigation illustrates the perils of lacking such a
portfolio. The incumbent carriers who won large settlements from
Vonage all had much larger patent portfolios. 239 The patent
disparities among the parties created the opportunity to drag
Vonage into an expensive litigation that simultaneously limited its
ability to obtain capital investment.
Of course, commercial litigation always tends to favor
larger companies over smaller ones. The costs of extended and
fact-intensive litigation are more easily borne by larger and more
experienced companies, particularly when the opposing parties are
new startups who need capital investment (which is very common
240in the communications industry). It was not merely size alone,
however, that hurt Vonage in this litigation. It was that this specific
doctrine-the law surrounding patent infringement-lent itself
particularly well to efforts to exploit size disparities.
The concerns surrounding these developments extend well
beyond Vonage. Looking ahead, one fear is that patent law could
eventually be used in other interconnection contexts. Most
236 See, e.g., Julie Bort, Software Patent Reform Needed To Stop Legal Bullying,
NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 14, 2009; Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why
Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1068 (2008).
237 Id. at 1080.
238 Cable Seen as Less Vulnerable to VoIP Patent Disputes, TELEVISION A.M.,
Apr. 9, 2007.
239 See supra pp. 30-31.
240 See Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
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troublingly, there are fears that it could help fuel consolidation of
Internet backbone services, which are currently competitive.
241
Moving beyond the patent law context, a second example
of a law that size disparities implicitly transform into an incumbent
entrenchment device is the in-market exception to the automatic
roaming rule. Recall that the exception applies even if the carrier
has not yet constructed infrastructure, and even if the spectrum has
yet to be cleared. 42 The logic of the exception is to encourage
carriers to build out service by denying them roaming rights in
these areas. It is, in essence, a buildout requirement for spectrum
licensees.
At first glance, the exception seems reasonable-
encouraging new facilities construction is a worthwhile policy
goal. Upon closer examination, however, the implicit pro-
incumbent bias of this effective buildout requirement becomes
evident. Specifically, the larger a carrier becomes, the less
burdensome the buildout requirement becomes. By contrast, the
smaller the carrier, the more burdensome this expensive and
capital-intensive requirement becomes.
Again, it is not so much that these laws themselves are pro-
incumbent, but that the disparity of size reflects through the laws,
and effectively transforms them into entrenching devices.
III. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ENTRENCHMENT
EFFECTS
The last two Parts have established that law has helped
entrench incumbents in communications industries, and that the
intersection of companies' size with law explains why law
developed this way. This Part examines the implications of these
observations upon both regulatory and deregulatory theories of
communications policy. With respect to regulatory policies, my
analysis implies that many of the new FCC's regulatory proposals
will prove futile in reversing incumbents' entrenchment.
Examining these implications is especially timely, given that the
new Obama Administration and its FCC have already proposed
new regulations, and are actively considering more.
241 Werbach, supra note 171, at 372-73 ("The possibility that interconnection on
the Internet will no longer be a matter of technical sufficiency and business
agreement, but rather require negotiation with a group of intellectual property
right-holders, [is] frightening .... ").
242 Howard Buskirk, T-Mobile Calls Verizon Wireless Roaming Concessions
Too Little, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 5, 2009.
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A. Implications for Regulatory Policy
At the outset, I should note that the distinction between
competing "regulatory" and "deregulatory" theories is problematic.
In fact, one implication of this Article is that the dichotomy
between regulation and deregulation is not the best prism to view
modem communications policy debates. Instead, a more accurate
approach would be to analyze whether or not a given policy tends
to entrench the status quo.
As illustrated above, incumbents have been entrenched not
through deregulation alone, but through a combination of both
regulatory and deregulatory policies. In the municipal broadband
context, for instance, incumbents have pushed for aggressive
regulations to entrench their position. The government's limited
allocation of spectrum for wireless broadband is another example
of incumbent-entrenching regulation. In other contexts, however,
deregulation has helped entrench incumbent positions. For
instance, lifting spectrum caps and ending special access price
regulations are examples of deregulatory policies that strengthened
incumbents' competitive positions.
With this disclaimer, I have nonetheless adopted the
regulatory/deregulatory dichotomy for the remainder of this
Section. The reason is that most of the important policy debates
happening today tend to depend on one's preference for regulatory
solutions. The FCC, for instance, is considering a range of
potential regulations (detailed below) that would scale back
various deregulatory policies adopted over the last decade.
To provide context, after years of aggressive deregulation,
both Congress and the FCC have become increasingly skeptical in
recent months of the consequences of industry consolidation. The
election of President Obama, coupled with these growing concerns,
has created a political environment far more conducive to new
regulation than in the recent past. And new regulatory efforts are
proceeding on several different fronts.
Interestingly, many of these new regulatory efforts were
initiated toward the end of Republican FCC Chairman Kevin
Martin's term. In 2007, for instance, the FCC imposed the
automatic roaming rule, which provided partial relief for small and
midsized carriers.2 43 Martin also pressured the national wireless
carriers to reform early termination fees, and these threats led to
modest changes in industry practices. 44 With respect to broadband
access, Martin's FCC ultimately voted to sanction Comcast for its
alleged blocking of services that used popular peer-to-peer
243 2007 Roaming Order, supra note 69, at 15,818-19.
244 See Martin Says FCC To Pursue ETF Preemption as Early as July, WASH.
TELECOM NEWSWIRE, June 12, 2008.
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protocols including BitTorrent.245 Finally, the FCC also adopted
service rules in the 700 MHz spectrum auction that required the
winner of the large regional "C Block" spectrum licenses to
operate "open" networks.
246
Since the 2008 presidential election, the embrace of
regulatory solutions has gained even more steam. The 2009 federal
stimulus legislation explicitly imposed nondiscrimination
requirements on broadband access providers that received stimulus
funds.24 7 To accomplish this goal, the stimulus legislation
incorporated the FCC's earlier policy statement, which states the
FCC's general preference for open networks ("Policy
Statement") .248
Both Congress and the new FCC have also signaled a new
willingness to investigate and regulate alleged anticompetitive
practices in the wireless industry. These practices include handset
exclusivity agreements, and the blocking of certain applications on
wireless devices. 249 The latter practice is illustrated by Apple and
AT&T's controversial decision to limit both Skype and Google
Voice on the iPhone-a decision that has raised many skeptical
eyebrows among policymakers.
250
Concerns over the limitations imposed by wireless carriers
have also spurred calls for "wireless Carterfone" and "wireless
network neutrality" requirements.251 Under these regulations,
245 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Formal Complaint of Free Press and
Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-
to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028 (2008). The Comcast Order was one
of the FCC's most historically significant orders, and it signaled the FCC's
determination to prevent Internet service providers from abusing their control
over access facilities.
246 See Second Report and Order, In re of Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-
762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, 22 FCC Rcd. 15,289, 15,294 (2007) (adopting
open device and open application requirements for C Block).
247 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div.
B, Title VI (2009). These requirements only apply to grants from the NTIA. Id.
248 Policy Statement, Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the
Internet over Wireline Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005) [hereinafter FCC
Internet Policy Statement].
249 Brad Reed, FCC To Scrutinize Wireless Industry; FCC Will Look at State of
Wireless Competition, Truth-in-Billing, NETWORK WORLD, Aug. 21, 2009.
250 See Saul Hansell, Apple Tells F.C.C. It Is Still Pondering Google Voice
Application for the iPhone, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at B3. Notably, AT&T
has reversed its policy following both media and regulatory scrutiny, though
Apple has yet to approve Google Voice at the time of this writing. Saul Hansell,
AT&T To Let iPhone Users Make Calls on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2009, at B8.
251 See, e.g., Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 389 (2007); see
also Skype Commc'ns S.A.R.L., Petition To Confirm a Consumer's Right To
Use Internet Communications Software and Attach Devices to Wireless
Networks, Docket No. RM-11361 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Feb. 20, 2007).
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wireless users would be allowed to connect any non-harmful
device, and to run any non-harmful application, over any wireless
network.252 For example, under this requirement, an iPhone user
would not be limited to AT&T, but could sign up with any carrier.
This user would also be able to access any application on the
network-thus, AT&T's initial restriction of Google Voice on the
iPhone would have been prohibited under this type of "openness"
regime.
The most important regulatory battle ahead, however, is
arguably what has come to be known as the "network neutrality"
or "open networks" debate. At its essence, the dispute centers on
whether incumbent broadband access providers such as cable and
telephone companies will abuse their control over access facilities.
Some of these concerns are that providers could block certain data
or applications. Others are that access providers could strike
exclusive deals to transmit certain content more quickly, which
would ultimately create a crowded "slow" lane for providers who
could not afford to make exclusive deals.
The FCC has recently taken concrete, and controversial,
steps to enact policies it claims will protect open networks.
Specifically, the FCC proposed in a recent rulemaking notice to
codify as formal rules the four "openness" principles in its
previous Policy Statement.253 The Notice also, however, proposed
expanding the scope of the Policy Statement's protections by
adopting both "nondiscrimination" and "disclosure" requirements
(also known as the "fifth" and "sixth" principles).254 This
rulemaking proceeding is currently pending. Congress could of
course weigh in as well and provide more explicit authority to
enforce nondiscrimination, though legislation does not appear
likely anytime soon.
Regardless of what (if any) regulations the FCC ultimately
adopts, my analysis suggests that many of these new and proposed
regulations could easily prove futile. The reason is that incumbents
have become so firmly entrenched that they may now be beyond
the power of law to regulate them-or at least beyond the power of
the more limited new laws being considered today.
Recent history has shown that entrenchment can occur in
multiple ways. For that reason, eliminating one entrenchment
252 Wu, supra note 251; Skype Commc'ns S.A.R.L., supra note 251.
253 Preserving the Open Internet; Broadband Industry Practices, GN Docket No.
09-191 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Oct. 22, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Notice]. The
original 2005 Policy Statement outlined four principles, including the freedom
of consumers to (1) access the content of their choice; (2) access the applications
and services of their choice; (3) use the legal devices of their choice; and (4)
enjoy competition among network, application, and service providers. FCC
Internet Policy Statement, supra note 248.
254 2009 Notice, supra note 253.
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mechanism does not necessarily foreclose others. For instance,
incumbents have repeatedly shown that they can use laws external
to the FCC's jurisdiction to entrench their position in the
communications context, as Verizon's patent litigation against
Vonage illustrates. Imagine, for instance, that the FCC enacted the
proposed neutrality regulations that would prevent incumbents like
Verizon from blocking Vonage, or-more likely-from dragging
their feet on providing interconnection. Even in this world,
companies like Verizon could still use both the law and its size to
entrench itself by pursuing patent litigation against Vonage. The
FCC's regulations would not limit Verizon in the patent law
context at all.255
In addition to using these "external" laws, consolidated
incumbents can also use their control over their vast network
infrastructures to evade any pro-entry requirement that the FCC
ultimately imposes. Consider, for instance, the FCC's proposed
"open device" requirement, which would allow wireless users to
use any non-harmful device on any wireless network. The goal of
such a requirement is not only to spur device innovation, but also
to spur competition among carriers. The rationale is that carriers
would have to compete on other grounds (e.g., prices, bandwidth)
if they could no longer lock in exclusive deals with handset
manufacturers. Indeed, that is precisely why smaller carriers are
urging the FCC to end exclusivity agreements.
256
Even assuming, then, that this requirement existed, wireless
carriers could squeeze smaller carriers in other ways. An open
device requirement, for instance, would not address the increasing
price of special access services. Neither would it address the lack
of available low-frequency spectrum, nor the problems associated
with the data and in-market exceptions to the automatic roaming
rule. In short, carriers' control over the network infrastructure and
spectrum would help limit the proposed regulations' ability to spur
entry and competition.
Other types of evasions would also likely emerge if the
FCC adopts its proposed nondiscrimination regulations. Indeed,
given that incumbents have proven quite adept at finding new ways
to entrench themselves, these evasions may difficult to predict at
present.
255 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 9, at 21-22 ("[T]he PTO's issuance of broad
patents has allowed Verizon and other incumbent providers to pursue via
government-granted property rights what they have been unable to achieve via
FCC regulation.").
256 Brad Reed, How Ending Exclusivity Agreements Would Change the Telecom
Industry; Small Wireless Providers Could Benefit from End of Exclusivity Deals
for iPhones and Other Devices, NETWORK WORLD, July 9, 2009.
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One good example of this versatility is the recent proposal
by cable companies such as Time Warner to impose monthly data
caps, which give users a quota for how much information they can
download in a month.257 On first glance, this requirement seems
neutral and nondiscriminatory. Upon closer examination, however,
several problems emerge.
Most importantly, monthly caps can potentially stifle new
video competition. 258 Video is in many ways the future of
broadband-and people are increasingly watching video over their
broadband lines through services like Hulu and iTunes. These
shows are also increasingly available in high definition (HD),
which is more bandwidth-intensive.
The monthly caps, while seemingly harmless, pose a
potential entry barrier to these types of emerging video services.
Under some of the proposed caps, downloading a few HD movies
could quickly put a customer over the monthly limit, thus
subjecting them to penalty fees.259 The ultimate result would be to
raise the costs of these movies, thus making the "on demand"
movies offered by the incumbent cable company comparatively
cheaper. This problem will only get worse as next-generation video
services emerge that require even more bandwidth.26o
The larger point is that incumbents have multiple ways to
evade new regulations. Indeed, this analysis all assumes that the
final regulations will actually have legitimate force. It is quite
possible that they will not. For instance, incumbents may leverage
their political power to lobby for loopholes in the regulations-
such as an expansive exception to nondiscrimination for
257 Cable Operators Diverge on Bandwidth Optimization Plans, COMm. DAILY,
Apr. 10, 2009 (describing details of Time Warner Cable's proposals).
258 Nate Anderson, Even When Not Explicit, ISP Data Caps Still Haunt Users,
ARS TECHNICA, Apr. 24, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/
04/even-when-not-explicit-isp-data-caps-remain.ars.
259 Id
260 Further, the caps raise the difficult issue of whether the FCC should care
about "intent." Monthly caps are arguably problematic even if they are adopted
with the purest of intentions. Cable providers, after all, argue that caps are
needed to manage bandwidth, and that the networks would otherwise be neutral
and nondiscriminatory. The problem with this argument, however, is that the
caps as currently proposed are extremely overbroad. Congestion, for instance, is
less of a problem at 3 a.m. when most people are asleep. However, the bans as
proposed would presumably still apply to 3 a.m. downloads that have little
impact on other, non-insomniac, users. The larger point is that this type of
practice could very easily stifle new video competitors, while simultaneously
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"reasonable network management"-that ultimately swallow the
rule.26'
In sum, the ultimate implication is that we should be
skeptical of regulation's ability to stop strategic behavior by large
consolidated incumbents. So long as the underlying incentives to
stifle competition are present, incumbents seem to find a way to
entrench themselves. The point, however, is not that regulation is
hopeless, but that the current range of regulations being considered
are likely inadequate to the task, and will need significant revision.
The more specific policy recommendations that follow from this
conclusion are outlined in Part IV.
B. Implications for Deregulatory Policy Advocates
The ability of consolidated incumbents to entrench
themselves through law also has important implications for
advocates of deregulatory policy. Critiques of the FCC's
deregulatory policies over the last decade are not in short
supply.2 62 Thus, my discussion of the implications on deregulatory
policy need only be brief.
Over the past decade, the FCC has pursued an aggressive
deregulatory strategy in many (though not all) formerly regulated
markets.2 63 The FCC has, for instance, deregulated every form of
broadband access, including wireline and wireless services. 264 The
extensive deregulation of aspects of the wireless industry have
already been documented, and includes the lifting of spectrum
caps, various merger approvals, and the eliminating of special
access pricing regulation.
The common rationale underlying these policies is that the
markets are competitive enough to check incumbents, thus making
regulation unnecessary. Even assuming, however, the markets are
not currently competitive, the FCC has routinely assumed that the
threat of competitive entry is credible enough to prevent
anticompetitive practices. 65 For instance, both the broadband
access and special access markets have been deregulated under the
explicit assumption that convergence and new technologies pose
261 Cecilia Kang, Biggest Net Neutrality Boosters Question FCC Proposal,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/
cisco a company that.html.
262 See generally TURNER, supra note 129.
263 See generally Blevins, supra note 65 (outlining various deregulatory
measures adopted in numerous regulatory contexts).
264 See supra note 129.
265 For instance, deregulation of the special access market was explicitly
premised on the notion that collocation constituted a sufficient threat of entry to
check incumbent prices and behavior. See GAO REPORT, supra note 59.
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competitive threats to incumbents.266 The correctness of this
assumption has arguably been the central debate in
communications policy circles over the past decade.
The entrenchment effects described in earlier sections are
relevant to this debate. Recall that deregulatory policies assume
that competitive entry is feasible. The problem, however, is that
the entrenchments described above are stifling that entry, thus
undermining a key assumption of deregulatory advocates. Wireless
and municipal broadband, for instance, have both been cited to
justify the deregulation of wireline broadband access. This
"intermodal" competition, advocates argue, makes regulation
unnecessary. 267 As we have seen though, entrenchment effects
have significantly limited these technologies' ability to evolve into
full, viable substitutes for the incumbent services. For this reason,
the assumption that competitive entry is possible should arguably
be relaxed.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Having described the implications of my analysis, this Part
offers more concrete policy recommendations for the future. The
ultimate recommendation is that policymakers need to adopt more
aggressive and comprehensive regulatory schemes to address the
deep and systematic entrenchment that blocks competitive entry.
The more limited regulatory policies being adopted and considered
today in isolation are not sufficient to counter this entrenchment. In
short, policymakers need to "think bigger," and to consider
adopting far more aggressive reforms.
Indeed, the regulations being proposed today may not only
be futile, they may-ironically-further cement entrenchment by
creating the illusion that the FCC has adequately addressed these
problems. In other words, the appearance of addressing
entrenchment may undermine political momentum and awareness
for more comprehensive changes.
A. Structural Remedies
266 Id; see also Jim Chen, Antitrust Issues in the Telecommunications and
Software Industries. Titantic Telecommunications, 25 Sw. U. L. REv. 535, 552
(1996) ("In a contestable, albeit imperfectly competitive market, it is the threat
of entry rather than the fact of entry 'that disciplines incumbents and forces
them to serve consumers efficiently."' (quoting Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J.
Baumol, Deregulation and the Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON
REG. 111, 120 (1984))).
267 Blevins, supra note 65, at 245-56 (discussing theoretical foundations of
intermodal competition in the communications law context).
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The analysis above adopts a fairly pessimistic view of the
efficacy of regulation to counter incumbents' barriers to
competitive entry. The combination of size and law has rendered
these incumbents beyond law's power in many respects. As long as
consolidated companies maintain their relative size and resources,
they will have many avenues for evading regulations designed to
promote and protect competitive entry, many of which cannot even
be predicted.
For this reason, the ultimate solution may require structural
remedies that would essentially break up the industry into
relatively smaller entities. Although these remedies would
arguably be the most effective, they are also the most politically
unrealistic. While I fully recognize the political obstacles to such
reforms, I nonetheless analyze their benefits and costs below, if for
no other reason than to expand the boundaries of "acceptable"
political debate on the topic.
The recent banking crisis provides a potentially interesting
parallel to this debate. The near meltdown of the American
banking system in 2008 opened political space for scholars to raise
some fundamental questions about the current structure of the
industry. Several prominent economists called for aggressive
regulatory intervention. For instance, former IMF Chief Economist
Simon Johnson proposed that the nation's largest banks should be
broken up into smaller entities.268 Echoing other economists'
critiques, Johnson argued that the banks' size posed systemic risks
and gave the companies disproportionate political power. Without
such actions, Johnson explained, the other regulations he proposed
would be "insufficient."
269
I would argue that many of these same concerns apply to
the modem communications industry. For that reason, we should
begin at least debating more aggressive structural remedies. These
remedies could take multiple forms, but some of the most obvious
ones would include: (1) prohibiting wireless/wireline affiliations;
(2) prohibiting entities with special access infrastructure from
entering the retail wireless market; (3) structural, or at least
functional, separations between wholesale broadband access
providers and retail Internet service providers (coupled with
prohibitions on exclusivity agreements); (4) breaking up the AT&T
and Verizon wireline divisions in a manner similar to the original
breakup of AT&T.
Putting aside the political obstacles for now, these
aggressive remedies would arguably be the most effective reform
for several reasons. First, these types of structural remedies have
268 Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC MONTHLY MAG., Mar. 2009
("Oversize institutions disproportionately influence public policy ....").
269 Id
57
Blevins: DEATH OF THE REVOLUTION
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2010
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 85 (2009)
already proven to be effective. In fact, the most effective
broadband access competition that exists today-between
incumbent telephone and cable companies-exists because of
mandated structural separations under section 652 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.270 This law "presumptively bans
the cross-ownership of cable and telephone companies." 271 The
structural division of these types of companies arguably provides
the foundation for the intermodal competition at the heart of the
FCC's deregulation of broadband access. Without it, mergers
between these types of companies could have materialized,
particularly given the Court's increasing reluctance to apply
antitrust laws to these industries.
272
Second, structural remedies would remove many of the
incentives to stifle competitors. Indeed, if we assume that most
isolated regulations will be futile, then the only way to prevent
entrenchment is to remove the underlying incentives to act
anticompetitively.
For instance, if lawmakers prohibited affiliates of large
special access providers from entering the wireless market, then it
would reduce the incentives to exploit special access infrastructure
to squeeze smaller wireless carriers. Similarly, if wholesale
broadband access providers (i.e., the facilities owners) were
prohibited from offering retail broadband services, then the
incentives to discriminate through facilities control would also be
reduced.
Third, creating smaller entities would also lower the
administrative costs of new regulation. Any type of
nondiscrimination regulation will only be as good as the regulatory
oversight regime. And even assuming good faith on the part of the
regulators, it will still be difficult to monitor networks and to make
difficult judgment calls about whether certain practices have
anticompetitive effects. If, by contrast, the company in question
has less incentive to discriminate in the first place, then the stakes
of getting enforcement right become much lower. In this respect,
structural remedies would prevent the need for ongoing
government oversight.
For similar reasons, these types of structural remedies
would also help address agency capture, and would help prevent
future FCC administrations from watering down the ultimate
enforcement regime. The fear would be that future administrations
might be captured, or at least more politically aligned with
270 47 U.S.C. § 572 (2006) (presumptively banning acquisitions between cable
operators and local exchange carriers).
271 Chen, supra note 44, at 1346-47.
272 See Blevins, supra note 65, at 282-87 (discussing recent limitations of
antitrust applicability to regulated communications industries).
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incumbents, and would therefore refuse to vigorously enforce
nondiscrimination requirements.
Finally, creating smaller entities would arguably promote
innovation. Stuart Benjamin and others have noted that more-
established firms are less likely to pursue technologies that could
disrupt existing benefits. He writes:
[T]he theoretical and empirical literature indicates
that small, entrepreneurial firms with little ability
(relative to powerful incumbents) to influence the
regulatory process are particularly likely to be the
sources of breakthrough, or disruptive, innovation.
On the theoretical side, economists from Joseph
Schumpeter onwards have noted that such
entrepreneurial firms may be more likely than large
firms with vested interests in existing products to be
able to move outside routine tasks into "untried
technological possibilities.
',273
Needless to say, these types of aggressive structural
remedies have problems of their own. Most obviously, these
proposals are politically unrealistic at the moment. My
recommendation should therefore be seen as the beginning of an
effort to shift the boundaries of the political and policy debate.
Indeed, my own view is that the range of the current debates has
become unduly narrow in recent years.
Even assuming, however, that the political will existed for
such aggressive remedies, such measures could not remove all
incentives to use law to entrench one's market position. For
instance, separating wholesale broadband access from retail
broadband would not necessarily reduce incentives to limit
competition at the physical layer. Wholesale broadband providers
would still have incentives to prevent municipal governments from
constructing new physical broadband facilities for instance. But
that said, even if they retained these incentives, their reduced size
would simultaneously reduce their political power to shape pro-
incumbent legislation.
In addition, structural remedies come with costs of their
own. Put another way, consolidation is not without its benefits. In
many instances, it allows companies to enjoy efficiencies and
economies of scale that ultimately benefit consumers. The
important question, then, in analyzing consolidation is not so much
whether it exists, but whether its existence intersects with law in
anticompetitive ways that entrench market position.
273 Benjamin & Rai, supra note 9, at 13-14 (quoting JOSEPH SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, CEMOCRACY 13 (1942)).
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Consolidation in the railroad industry, for instance, has
numerous benefits. In this context, consolidation presents less of a
threat because consumers have other choices for travel such as
flying or driving. Consolidation in the special access and
broadband access markets, by contrast, is much different because
this diverse range of choices does not exist here. In these markets,
there is simply nowhere else to go.
In short, the implication of this Article's analysis is that
aggressive structural remedies may ultimately be the only effective
way to end the excessive entrenchment caused by the intersections
of consolidation and law. Considering the considerable political
obstacles to these policies, however, the next Section reviews more
practical near-term recommendations.
B. Alternative Remedies
The fact that certain regulations being proposed today may
prove futile does not imply that the only possible beneficial reform
consists of more extreme structural remedies. While structural
remedies would arguably be more effective, policymakers could at
least improve the problems that entrenchment creates by rethinking
their regulatory approach. In particular, any attempt to impose
new, more progressive regulations on the industry should
incorporate the following principles.
First, policymakers need to understand the importance of a
comprehensive approach to regulatory reform. Promoting
competitive entry presents policymakers with a "whack-a-mole"
problem. More formally, addressing industry entrenchment in one
context is often futile because it merely reallocates entrenchment
strategies rather than removing them. For instance, imposing
spectrum caps does little good if the roaming and special access
regulatory regimes remain in place. Larger carriers and their
wireline affiliates can simply leverage their resources elsewhere to
limit competitive entry.
Thus, reform efforts need to be more comprehensive in
scope. To truly promote competition within the wireless broadband
market, several things need to happen simultaneously. First,
spectrum caps need to be reinstituted. Second, special access prices
need to be re-regulated (assuming these assets remain with
wireline affiliates). Third, roaming regulations need to extend to
data services. Fourth, wireless carriers should be required to abide
by open device and nondiscrimination requirements. The problem,
however, is that unless policymakers enact virtually all of these
measures, incumbent carriers can exploit the absence of any one of
them to entrench themselves against competitors. And once the
smaller and midsized carriers vanish (as they currently are), it will
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be much harder for new competitors of equal size to emerge, even
if the other measures are eventually enacted in piecemeal fashion.
In short, untimely regulation is effectively the same as no
regulation.
Interestingly, the very structure of FCC rulemaking
contributes to this problem. Generally, the FCC pursues regulatory
reform by opening notice-and-comment proceedings on narrow
issues. The roaming proceedings, for instance, are procedurally
distinct from the spectrum cap proceedings, which are initiated in a
completely different docket.274 The FCC should therefore institute
more proceedings that are global in scope, and that cover a more
diverse range of topics. The national broadband plan proceeding,
which covers several distinct issues, is a welcome development in
this respect.
275
Next, policymakers should also pursue remedies that I call
"structural light." The idea here is similar to facilitating
"intramodal" competition.276 Essentially, these types of policies
seek to create more, and smaller, entities without taking the more
radical step of breaking up existing companies. One such remedy,
for instance, would be new spectrum cap policies that are explicitly
intended to maximize the number of providers. Another "structural
light" remedy would be a more aggressive use of divestitures in
merger proceedings.
Another recommended intramodal policy would be to enact
stricter open access regulations that would require wholesale
broadband access providers to provide nondiscriminatory access
for all competing retail broadband providers. Generally speaking,
open access policies "require telecommunications providers ... to
make available to their competitors . . . various parts of their
network or service, so that the competitors can ... compete...
without having to replicate the full [network infrastructure] .277 As
a recent comprehensive study from Harvard University's Berkman
Center documents, open access policies played a critical role in the
success of other countries' broadband policies. 278 Indeed, these
countries now boast superior broadband service to the United
States on virtually every major metric (speed, deployment, etc.).
279
274 See supra at note 13-14.
275 Notice of Inquiry, A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, 24 FCC Rcd.
4342 (2009) (seeking public input on broadband policies).
276 Blevins, supra note 65, at 245-49 (discussing foundations of intramodal
competition).
277 BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y, supra note 200, at 77.
278 Id at 74-151.
279 Amit M. Schejter, International Benchmarks: The Crisis in U.S.
Communications Policy Through a Comparative Lens, in COMMUNICATIONS
FOR ALL, supra note 88, at 57, 62-65.
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Re-embracing these types of open access policies would help this
country close the gap.
Finally, and at the very least, Congress and the courts
should ensure that the FCC has flexible authority to deal with the
various forms of incumbent entrenchment that will inevitably
emerge with broadband access and retail markets. Indeed, the
scope of the FCC's authority in this area-known as its "ancillary
jurisdiction"-is currently being challenged in the D.C. Circuit by
Comcast. 280 As I have written at length in a separate article, the
court should uphold the FCC's authority here, and recognize the
wide latitude that courts have historically given the FCC to protect




One of the perennial problems in communications
regulation is that policymakers often fight "the last war." My fear
is that the current FCC may be repeating history in this respect.
Although the new proposed reforms are a welcome development,
they are arguably a few years too late. Consolidation has
permanently altered the regulatory landscape, and any new
regulatory regime must account for these recent changes. In
particular, it must account for the fact that entrenchment has
sharply increased in the past few years and that incumbents
therefore have more options to evade isolated regulatory
requirements. In sum, my argument is not that reform is futile, but
that pursuing reforms that would have been quite effective earlier
in the decade may no longer be sufficient in 2009 and beyond. The
times, to paraphrase Dylan, have a'changed.
280 Ancillary jurisdiction refers generally to the FCC's authority to regulate
services over which they do not have explicit statutory authority under the
Communications Act of 1934. John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition
Promotion: A Unified Theory of the FCC's Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST.
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